How does one diminish discrimination? Many members of SPSSI, including the present authors, have tried to reduce discrimination through the application of good theories. We outline three theoretical approaches that Crosby, like many other psychologists, has taken as she has struggled with discrimination. Sometimes missing in Crosby’s approach, and often missing in the approach of others, is a frank avowal of values. We argue that the attempt to divorce science from values renders theories less effective than they need be and even allows unexamined values to contaminate good research.

Since the beginning of social psychology as a distinct subdiscipline, social psychologists have been concerned with discrimination and prejudice (Smith, 1983, 2003). Social psychologists with an affiliation to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) have been in the forefront of professionals attempting to find ways to diminish both prejudice—understood to reference feelings or
cognitions—and discrimination itself—understood to reference behaviors (Myers, 2005). The very first issue of SPSSI’s flagship journal, *The Journal of Social Issues (JSI)* was on the topic of racial and religious prejudice, and there have been at least 10 other issues concerned with discrimination, prejudice, or stereotyping.

It is, then, as part of a grand tradition that we have turned our attention to the question of discrimination in the United States of America. One of us (Crosby) has been professionally active in the study of discrimination for nearly 30 years. The other one of us (Bearman) is just beginning his labors in the discipline of social psychology. Yet, Bearman has already managed to do what some, but not all, of Crosby’s prior students have done: he has changed how his mentor thinks about issues.

The present article presents the reader with a somewhat unusual amalgam. At the center of the article is the odyssey of one now-seasoned social psychologist. Without making any claims about Crosby’s intellectual leadership in social psychology, we assume that Crosby is a creature of her time, both affected by and affecting the intellectual *zeitgeist* of contemporary social psychology (Gergen, 1973; Smith, 2003). Telling her story offers a window into thinking prevalent among many SPSSI members, and indeed among many American social psychologists in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Thus, in some ways, the brief history of Faye Crosby’s thinking represents a partial intellectual history of contemporary social psychology. At the end of the story comes an important shift in Crosby’s thinking, a shift that is in keeping with some developments in psychology like the current revival of the “positive psychology” movement (Seligman, 2003; Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005), originally fostered by Maslow (1954), but a shift that has been prompted to Crosby by her years as a feminist and by her current close collaboration with Bearman.

The story we present in this article has a beginning, a middle, and an end. We start by introducing a conundrum. We then proceed to describe the three theoretical guesses, also known as explanations, that have guided how Crosby has approached the conundrum and also how she and others have sought through “applied” work to contribute to the reduction of discrimination in the United States. After outlining the theories, we pause to take stock of how much effect the theories have had, not in molding of our discipline, but rather in shaping of American society. The news is not pretty. We conclude by suggesting one element that has been more absent from social psychology in the second half of the twentieth century than is, perhaps, optimal: the frank avowal of values. Science is a human activity and, as such, is permeated by values. When we do not acknowledge our values, our science is not only impoverished; it is contaminated.

**The Dilemma**

War brings changes to society and to scholarship (Smith, 1984). During both World War I and World War II, the American government turned to psychologists
to help engineer victories. Historians claim, for example, that the large-scale draft needed for World War I gave a big impetus to the use of intelligence tests in the United States (Smith, Nolen-Hoeksema, Fredrickson, & Loftus, 2002). During World War II, behavioral scientists were called upon to help the military control the behavior of its soldiers.

We would not be exaggerating to say that World War II gave birth to contemporary social psychology. The claim can be supported on a number of different grounds. Without the rise of Hitler, Kurt Lewin would likely never have come to the United States, and without its “father,” American social psychology (which until the 1990s was really most of social psychology) would never have come into existence. Without World War II, furthermore, we never would have seen either volume of the massive and influential *The American Soldier* (Stouffer et al., 1949; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, Williams, 1949); nor would Adorno and his collaborators have produced the watershed study presented in *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950).

Given its historical origins, it may not be surprising that early social psychologists had an appreciation and admiration for what they saw as the American creed. As a refugee, Kurt Lewin extolled psychologists to become active in the preservation of American democracy (Cherry & Deaux, 2004). Other observers from Europe were also struck by America’s self-avowed ideology of egalitarianism, democracy, and justice for all (Myrdal, 1944).

The effects of World War II were not limited to social psychologists who were mature adults at the time of hostilities. Also affected quite directly by the War were some people born in the late 1940s, after peace had been declared. One such person, Faye Crosby, born Faye Jacqueline Newman in 1947, lived a childhood filled with talk about and images of the War. Faye’s parents, Robert Newman and Andrée Cohen Newman, had met and married during Eisenhower’s North African campaign in the town of Oran in what was then the French overseas province of Algeria. Faye’s sister, Carole, had been born in 1945 in Casablanca. Although she despised the appellation “war bride,” Andrée Cohen Newman never tired of reminding her daughters about how fortunate they were to live in the great United States, where Jews and Gentiles could peacefully coexist and even intermarry. The accepted wisdom in Faye’s family of origin was that in America, freedom from ancient hostilities and prejudices meant that everyone could make a good life through hard work and well-disciplined intelligence. Whenever French family or friends criticized the United States for its boorishness or lack of culture, Andrée retorted with praise of her adopted country. America would never, according to Andrée, have tolerated a Pétain.

Imagine Faye’s surprise upon leaving the cocoon of childhood spent in the all-white affluent suburbs. High school and college years for Faye coincided with the civil rights movement and with the growing protests against the war in Vietnam, but it was not really until graduate school at Boston University that Faye became fully conscious of the vast disparities in the United States. Senior professors like Robert
Chin and Clara Mayo, and the young assistant professors Leonard Saxe, Robert Apsler, Ronald Abeles, and most of all Abigail Stewart all provided an education to the students at Boston University so that even the most naïve student learned about racism and sexism. Facts, cold, hard, and numerous, were challenging Faye’s idealized view of her country.

What Crosby was experiencing was symptomatic of “the American dilemma” (Myrdal, 1944). “The ‘American dilemma,’” wrote Gunnar Myrdal (1944/2005) “is the ever raging conflict between . . . the valuation preserved on the general plane which we shall call ‘The American Creed,’ and the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living” (p. 124). How can a country boast about its egalitarianism and its dedication to creating a good life for individuals from all groups in society while simultaneously producing, again and again, extraordinary inequalities among different groups of people?

Exploring Answers

How can it be that American behavior is so out of keeping with the American ideology? Presented with such a conundrum, the good social psychologist looks for explanatory theories. Social psychologists who belong to SPSSI are, of course, ever mindful of Lewin’s famous dictum “there is nothing so useful as a good theory.”

Over the course of Crosby’s career, three theoretical approaches have been especially prominent in the attempt to understand the discrepancy between word and deed in America. The first explanation questions the depth of American commitment to equality. This explanation might be called “the hypocrisy explanation.” The second assumes a deep and true commitment to some values, including those embodied in the America creed, but also acknowledges that people hold a multiplicity of different values and that values can sometimes be in conflict with each other. The final explanation casts the attitude–behavior discrepancy as a function of information processing limitations. The explanations that have figured centrally in Crosby’s work have also been conspicuous in many corners of social psychology over the last 30 or so years.

Hypocrisy in Action

During and after the Civil Rights movement and the race riots of the 1960s, survey researchers closely tracked the attitudes of White Americans toward people of color, and particularly toward Black Americans. In both local (e.g., Brigham, 1972) and national (e.g., Campbell, 1971) samples, pollsters asked white respondents to evaluate Blacks on a number of characteristics. They also asked Whites if they felt that African Americans were doing better, worse, or about the same as
themselves and whether they supported or opposed integration and school busing (e.g., Greeley & Sheatsley, 1971; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1964).

By and large, the surveys showed that Whites in the 1970s expressed much less overt prejudice than earlier generations of White Americans. Some analyses were able to document changes in the level of racial prejudice over successive age cohorts (Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978). Other analyses showed diminishing prejudice and increasing integrationist attitudes among greater and greater percentages of the population (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1964).

Some researchers were suspicious about the depth or sincerity of the White sentiments. Perhaps Whites were simply voicing ideas that were politically and socially acceptable without really having internalized the concepts of equality and inclusiveness. Perhaps overt racism had simply transformed itself into covert racism.

Such an idea was consistent with models of attitude change proposed separately by Herb Kelman (1961) and John McConahay (McConahay & Hough, 1976). Kelman outlined how people move from compliance to identification to internalization when they adopt new attitudes and opinions. McConahay and Hough (1976) developed a scale called the Modern Racism Scale to measure the extent of muted or covert anti-Black sentiment among White people.

Kelman’s and McConahay’s reasoning struck a responsive chord with Crosby who began to wonder if White people would show egalitarian, non-racist attitudes when the researchers were able to index the attitudes in a non-obtrusive way. Along with Stephanie Bromley and Len Saxe, Crosby performed a review of the relevant literature (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980). Published in Psychological Bulletin, the review examined three types of unobtrusive experiments that had been published since 1969: those comparing cross-race or same-race altruism; those comparing cross-race or same-race aggression; and those documenting nonverbal behaviors of whites toward Blacks.

Examination of the studies showed clear patterns. In situations where racial discrimination would be hard to conceal, such as face-to-face helping situations, Whites treated Blacks and Whites the same (e.g., Bickman & Kamzan, 1973; Bromley, Saxe, & Crosby, 1978; Wegner & Crano, 1975). But in more ambiguous situations, such as helping someone who was physically remote, Whites extended much less help to Blacks than to Whites (e.g., Benson, Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976; Gaertner, 1973). Similarly, laboratory studies of aggression found that White participants did not modify the levels of shock they believed they were administering to other White students as a function of anonymity, potential retaliation, and potential for censure; but providing anonymity, and reducing the potentials for retaliation and censure led White students to increase the levels of shock they believed they were delivering to Blacks (e.g., Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1973, 1976). Nonverbally, too, Whites acted less positively toward Blacks than toward other Whites (e.g., Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). The conclusion seemed
inescapable: Whites in America proved more egalitarian and inclusive in word than in deed.

Crosby et al. (1980) built their case by creating “box scores” in which they counted the number of published studies that showed favoritism for White targets, the number that showed favoritism for Black targets, and the number that showed no difference. No account was taken of the size of the samples or the size of the effects in the individual studies. Recently, a vastly more sophisticated analysis than that of Crosby et al. (1980) has been published in Personality and Social Psychology Review (Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005). Subjecting 48 experiments on altruism to a metaanalysis, Saucier et al. (2005) corroborated the original findings and confirmed the original conclusions.

Not only have psychologists revisited the specific issues of Crosby et al. (1980). Subsequent to the 1980 review article, several eminent social psychologists have extended further the very theory involved. Dovidio and Gaertner (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977) whose work was included in the original review, have elaborated a model of “aversive racism.” The “aversive racist” is a White person who would be distressed, or would find it aversive, to realize that he or she harbors any negativity toward, say, Blacks but who, in reality, feels less positively about people of color than about White people. Aversive racists have been found to behave differently toward White and Black targets but only when there is a plausible justification for so doing.

Whether or not scholars endorse the specific characterizations of aversive racism, many contemporary social scientists endorse the proposition that Whites’ explicit protestations of egalitarianism may not always reflect their deeply held convictions (Kuklinski et al., 1997; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gray, 2001). In their studies of affective priming, Russ Fazio and his colleagues found that White Americans react faster to images of Blacks than to images of Whites when they are primed with negative emotional words like “bad” and react faster to images of Whites than to images of Blacks when they are primed with positive emotional words (Fazio, 2001; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). Also using reaction time technology, Tony Greenwald and Mazahrin Banaji have proposed that Whites implicitly associate Black with negative concepts and White with positive concepts (Banaji, 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 2002).

Nor is racism the only negative attitude that is thought to be held covertly. Janet Swim and her colleagues (e.g., Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; Swim, Borgida, Maruyama, & Meyers, 1989; Swim & Sanna, 1996) and Francine Tougas and her colleagues (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & St-Pierre, 1999; Tougas, Crosby, Joly, & Pelchat, 1995) have shown that “modern” sexism has, by and large, replaced blatant sexism in many parts of North America. Peter Glick and Susan Fiske (Glick et al., 2000; Glick & Fiske, 1996) have documented some of the deleterious effects for women of “benevolent” sexism; benevolent sexists clearly differ from hostile
sexists in terms of how much they like women; but the protective stance of the benevolent sexist bespeaks stereotyping just as much as the aggressive stance of the hostile sexist does.

In sum, like Crosby and her colleagues, a considerable number of contemporary social psychologists seem to believe that the difference between expressed values and performed behavior may be due, at least in part, to the fact that the values expressed are not deeply held. Centuries of overt racism and sexism have not been erased. One real explanation for continued discriminatory treatment, according to this point of view, is that deep down Americans hold not the official ideology of equality and democracy but rather the ideologies of everyone for themselves and the defense of White privilege. Of course, as Jim Sidanius, Felicia Pratto, and their collaborators have shown, some Americans orient toward social dominance much more than others (Sidanius, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996), and, of course, some Americans are more racist and sexist than others. Yet, it could well be the case that at whatever level of dominance orientation and whatever level of prejudice, the typical American says that he or she is less racist and less sexist than he or she actually is.

Tragic Choices

Perhaps more than any other social psychologist, Milton Rokeach (1973, 1979a, 1979b) is well known for his study of human values. Rokeach defined values as the “core conceptions of the desirable within every individual and society” (Rokeach, 1979a, p. 2). Rokeach acknowledged that individuals can often act in ways that are not consistent with their values and do so with very little self awareness. Indeed, self-confrontation was the major technique that Rokeach advocated for bringing people into compliance with what one might call “morality” (Rokeach, 1979b). Rokeach also admitted that people may sometimes have conflicting values or values that prove in some individual instances to be in opposition with each other.

Rokeach’s conceptualizations have been used to explain a phenomenon that had fascinated social psychologists in the 1970s: the attitude–behavior discrepancy (Wicker, 1969; see also: Kraus, 1995). Studied mostly in the context of cognitive dissonance and other aspects of cognitive consistency theory (Abelson, 1994), the attitude–behavior discrepancy generated hundreds if not thousands of research studies (Myers, 1996).

Rokeach’s ideas can, of course, be applied to the issues of social inequality. Perhaps some men (and women) find themselves contributing to gender imbalances more or less against their own will. Perhaps some White people (and even people of color) contribute to racial imbalances not because of any hostility toward people of color, but rather because they are seeking some goal totally unrelated to race relations. Perhaps some heterosexual (and homosexual) people make life more
difficult for homosexuals not because of any animus but because they are striving toward a dearly held goal, the path to which involves trammeling the rights of lesbians or gays.

Crosby, having lived her life as a socio-economically and racially privileged woman, had experienced firsthand situations where imbalances were perpetuated as a form of “collateral damage” (to use a term that is, alas, all too topical) often without any specific awareness let alone any intention of harm, and she had participated in the problem from both sides (Crosby & Blake-Beard, 2004). In other words, sometimes Crosby was the target of harm or disadvantage. Sometimes she was the perpetrator, however unwittingly.

Particularly instructive is an instance in which Crosby had unwittingly contributed to racial problems in the city in which she lived and worked and a city which, unlike most people, she claimed to love. In the summer of 1977, Crosby and her then husband and their young son Matthew moved to New Haven, Connecticut. They found an apartment and a preschool for Matt. By January of 1978 it was time to think about where Matt might go to first grade. Crosby asked the other parents at the preschool what they intended to do and what they recommended. Virtually everyone suggested that Matt had only two options: the city-wide magnet school or the expensive, private elementary school. At age 4, Matt had developed a taste for poetry, and as one parent said: “You cannot send a boy who recites poetry into any old school. The other boys will knock his block off.” When Matt’s name was not drawn in the lottery for the magnet school, the Crosbys took a deep breath, emptied out their savings, and sent Matt to The Foote School, where he flourished.

One night in late 1979, sitting at her dining room table working on page proofs for the Crosby et al. (1980) article, Crosby paused to reflect on the attitude–behavior link. She mentally congratulated herself and her family on staying within the city of New Haven rather than fleeing to the suburbs. The self-congratulations stopped abruptly as Crosby had an epiphany: no doubt, the public schools in New Haven were predominantly Black. In choosing to send her adored bibliophilic son to Foote School, Faye (she just then realized) had inadvertently contributed to the racial divide in New Haven. Would she have done differently had she been conscious at the moment of her decision of all aspects of the situation? Would she have sent Matt into an environment in which he would have been derided for his love of poetry in order to keep with her own principles of integration? Counterfactuals are impossible to know, but Matt was still attending the Foote School until the family moved to Massachusetts in 1985. Faced with what Calabesi and Bobbitt (1978) called “tragic choices,” Crosby placed one dearly held value (the well being of her son) above another dearly held value (racial equality).

Crosby’s own experience as a perpetrator of racial imbalance—on many occasions and not just the one described—softened her tendencies toward censure of discriminatory others. Perhaps people are not so much hypocritical as they are unaware. Until someone confronts a person with the conflict between their actions
and their stated values, as Rokeach has counseled people to do, the offending person might not even know that he or she is causing offense. Even when people become aware that they are causing an offense, sometimes another value is so important to them that they must give it priority.

If as a White person in America, Crosby had numerous occasions to perpetuate her privilege, she also had many personal experiences with collateral damage as a woman in a man’s world. It is perhaps illuminating, however, that Crosby’s feminist consciousness did not originally derive from simple reflections on the inequities of her own life. Rather it developed as a result of reading the nascent literature in feminist psychology in the 1970s and then applying what she was reading to her situation. The coming-to-consciousness through reading and research was, of course, an experience of many feminists of Crosby’s era (Klonis, Endo, Crosby, & Worell, 1997).

Because of her feminism, Crosby attracted feminist students. One of her first doctoral students, Lisa Silberstein, questioned how young women and men were able to combine parenthood with marriage and careers. Silberstein (1992) conducted an intensive study of 20 couples, all of whom were married and had at least one child, and all of whom had two careers under one roof. Separately and at length she interviewed both the woman and the man in each couple.

Silberstein found that virtually all of the couples had begun their married lives with high expectations for gender equity. Several of them had seen the sexist marriages of their parents as something to avoid. Yet, the great majority of the couples ended up reproducing the gender-imbalanced division of labor once they had a child. What had happened? The birth of the child brought with it two surprises: children take time, and children are expensive. When the young couples struggled together to figure out how to find the time and the money for the children, they noted that the man earned a higher salary than the woman. So the logical decision in their little microcosm reproduced—and perpetuated—the greater divisions in society.

More recently, Francine Deutsch (1999, 2001) has replicated Silberstein’s findings—but with a twist. Deutch interviewed 300 dual-career families in New England, some of whom worked shift work. In a certain proportion of the families, the men espoused a very “traditional” sex-role ideology according to which the father of the family was meant to be the breadwinner and the mother was meant to stay out of the paid labor force. Those families were no less and no more likely to have equal sharing of domestic responsibilities than other working class families. What mattered more than values about how to divide labor was the value of nurturing the children and paying for whatever they needed.

Silberstein (1992) and Deutsch (1999) are not the only scholars to have documented the clash of dearly held values among dual career or dual job couples. Now there is a large literature on the topic (Crosby, 1987b, 1991; Crosby, Biernat, & Williams, 2004; Crosby & Jaskar, 1993; Hochschild & Machung, 1989; Steil,
One particularly fascinating aspect of the research is the discovery that couples create many little stories to tell themselves so that they need not explicitly confront the choice among values and so that they can avoid noticing how their behavior, while concordant with some values (e.g., keep the children safe) violates other values (e.g., maintain gender equity within the family). Of even greater interest is the way in which feminist scholars are exposing how social structures and prevailing societal ideologies constrain the very choices that people face (Crosby, 1987b; Krieger, 2004; Sabbatini & Crosby, 2003; Williams, 2001; Williams & Cooper, 2004).

One strong message from decades of social psychological research is that people overvalue the extent to which personality matters in determining behavior (Aronson, 1999; Ross, 1977). The very strong pull of any social context on how people behave has been documented by the classic experiments of social psychology (Asch, 1955; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Milgram, 1974). Of course, when the behavior in question is destructive or reprehensible, the conclusions about the potency of situational factors is all the more newsworthy. When individuals devalue equality and democracy in favor of other priorities, they may not be to blame. Not only do our value choices shape social structures, social structures reciprocally mold and constrain our value choices.

Cognitive Limitations

Social contexts are not the only constraints on how much we enact our values. Regardless of how much values inform our choices, our cognitive limitations guide and constrain how we perceive the world on which we act. Many psychologists have demonstrated people’s inconsistent record with regard to information processing. We process some kinds of information with stunning efficiency while other kinds of information pass by unnoticed. Perceptual changes which occur slowly may go unregistered (Simons, Franconeri, & Reimer, 2000), our ability to perceive even sudden, obvious changes may be impaired when cognitive load is high (Yantis & Jonides, 1990), and we may disregard information which does not fit into our perceptual frames (Mack & Rock, 1998; Simons & Chabris, 1999). People’s inability to process information correctly may be especially impaired when the information to be processed involves human beings (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977).

Crosby noticed one special case of poor information processing. Quite intelligent people attending Georgetown University, Smith College, Yale University, and the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University have shown themselves to be incapable of making cognitive transitions between information about discrimination presented in aggregated form and the same information presented as a sequence of separate evaluations. Crosby and her colleagues constructed reports of employee background and pay so that one gender (usually the women) was paid significantly less than the other gender even though the two had almost exactly the
same qualifications. When participants encountered the information in aggregated form, so that they could readily make comparisons between all departments within a company, they detected the discrimination. When the same participants or groups of participants encountered the same information in disaggregated form, making a series of gender comparisons one department at a time, they failed to detect the discrimination. (See Crosby, Iyer, & Sincharoen, in press, for a review.)

The line of work on perceptions of discrimination has serious implications. Generally, in people’s every day life, they come across information about possible instances of discrimination in little bits and pieces. Information dribbles in, and is not aggregated. Thus, it is hard for people to correctly perceive the level of discrimination in society. Even when people place a high value on equality and justice, unless they are able to perceive that discrimination exists, they cannot correct it.

One application of the findings concerns public policy. If we are serious about having people notice discriminatory patterns so that they can reduce discrimination, then we must have practices that make it the job of one or more people to aggregate data and to examine the aggregated data (Clayton & Crosby, 1992; Crosby & Clayton, 2001). Affirmative action is just such a policy (Crosby, 2004).

In a general sense, affirmative action occurs whenever an organization takes proactive steps to assure that all groups are treated fairly. Affirmative action has been influential in two aspects of American society: employment and higher education. Initiated by President Lyndon Johnson when he signed Executive Order 11246, affirmative action in employment is a policy that applies to any company of 50 or more employees that holds a contract with the federal government in excess of $50,000 per annum. Any such federal contractor must be an affirmative action employer (Woodhouse, 2002). That means that the company must keep accurate records and must show how closely the incumbency of people from targeted classes (meaning women and people of color) in specific job classifications matches the availability of people from the targeted classes who are qualified for the job.

An example may illustrate the process. Imagine that Company X knows, from census data and other public records, that 30% of the people who are qualified for a certain job are women; it must then see if the group of people whom it employs in that job generally contains about 70% men and 30% women. When incumbency falls too far short of availability, the company is enjoined to take corrective steps that are legal and that do not trammel the rights of white men. As long as the company makes a good faith effort to correct its problems, it cannot suffer censure from the government. If a company flagrantly flouts the law, it can be debarred from federal contracts.

In educational settings, too, one aspect of most affirmative action programs is the keeping of statistics to monitor how well the institution is doing in attracting and retaining qualified students from diverse backgrounds. Neither in employment nor in education does affirmative action permit the use of quotas; but in both arenas,
the policy encourages institutions to set goals and to follow time tables (Schmukler & Crosby, in press).

**Some Consequences**

Interested in diminishing discrimination since she first noticed its presence, Crosby has also exhibited a strong penchant for theorizing. She believed what Lewin (1944/1997) said:

> Many psychologists working today in an applied field are keenly aware of the need for close cooperation between theoretical and applied psychology. This can be accomplished in psychology, as it has been accomplished in physics, if the theorist does not look toward applied problems with highbrow aversion or with a fear of social problems and if the applied psychologist realizes there is nothing so practical as a good theory. (p. 288)

Crosby also believed that social psychology could and should complete the cycle, improving theory based on the findings obtained in “the real world” through applied work (Crosby & Franco, 2003).

Pushed by feminist realizations about the importance of context and of contextual variables (Crawford & Kimmel, 1999; Fine, 1986; Franz, Cole, Crosby, & Stewart, 1994; Sherif, 1982), social psychology as a discipline has arguably made progress in incorporating Lewinian style full-cycle research (Hebl & Dovidio, 2005; Skitka & Crosby, 2003). Looking at the recent work of John Darley (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003), one can see an excellent example of how the work of a mainstream social psychologist can evolve so that social psychological theories come to be shaped with an eye to what one found in previous “real world” applications of theories. Less and less does one encounter in social psychology the assumption that all social problems are interchangeable Petri dishes in which psychologists can test their abstract theories (Lott & Maluso, 1995). More and more, social psychologists see human participants as sentient beings rather than simply as breathing manikins on whom to hang their empirical manipulations (Crawford & Unger, 2004).

Has society changed as much as the discipline? By some lights, the change that has taken place in America in the last half century is astonishing. Judged by some standards, race relations have undergone revolutionary changes. Prior to 1947, no Black athlete had played baseball professionally with White athletes. Then Branch Rickey used Jackie Robinson to integrate baseball (Pratkanis & Turner, 1994a, 1994b). Today, every team in the American and National Leagues is integrated. In 1953, it was still legal for school districts in America to practice apartheid, keeping apart the little White children and the little children of color. A year later, with *Brown et al. v. Board of Education* (1954) segregation was no longer permitted in public schools. In June, 1963, George Wallace, then Governor of Alabama, stood in a doorway and attempted to prevent two Black students from attending the University of Alabama. In 1979, George Wallace apologized for his
prior actions, and in 1996 the George Wallace Foundation granted an award to one of the students whom Wallace had tried to block 33 years before; the award for courage.

But, if some statistics make it seem as if America has resolved its dilemma of race, other statistics tell a different story. A study of batting averages revealed that Black baseball players keep their jobs only if they out-hit and out-run their White colleagues (Staples, 2000). Other studies have shown that elementary and secondary schools in the United States are as severely segregated by race today as they were 50 years ago (Pettigrew, 2004). Given that residential patterns govern which schools are attended by which races, the persistence of residential segregation—fueled both by economic disparities and by the behavior of lending institutions—leaves room for little optimism. In recent years, the median Black family income has been 60% of the median White family income, and Black families average less than one-fifth the assets of White families in America (Cashin, 2004). Nor have banks proven themselves staunch friends of racial equity. A study by the Federal Reserve showed that affluent minority applicants were less likely in the early 1990s to obtain a mortgage than were poor White applicants (Horne, 1992) and another study found banks to deny mortgages to Blacks that Whites with the same qualifications are granted (Janofksy, 1998).

With gender, as with race, the initial image of progress can give way to a more pessimistic picture of continuing discrimination. Economists now show that the wage gap between women and men evaporates if one “controls” for family status: it is only mothers, not other women, who lag behind men in terms of the “return” on their human capital (Stanley & Jarrell, 1998). Yet, the disadvantage of employed mothers has little to do with situations that are “freely” chosen and much to do with discriminatory structures outside the women’s choosing (Crosby et al., 2004). Given that the vast majority of part-time workers are women with children, one must ask, for example, what, other than sexism, accounts for the lack of laws requiring employers to prorate benefits for part-time workers? Greed for profits would explain why employers might resist giving employment benefits proportional to the amount worked; but why not have laws that subordinate the greed of individual employers to the general good of the public?

In society, then, using good theories to explain the gap between the American creed and American behavior has yielded uneven results. While we might congratulate ourselves on how much good change we have wrought in the discipline of psychology or in the subdiscipline of social psychology, we might despair about how little change we have produced outside the ivory tower. When it comes time for the applied psychologist to look to social practice, it is unclear how useful our very good theories have been.

Why have our theories not been of more use? Several possible answers spring immediately to mind. Perhaps we are too impatient. Perhaps the good results of our theories will manifest themselves, but only after additional periods of gestation. Or perhaps our theories—and their empirical tests—have as yet been developed
insufficiently to yield benefit outside the discipline. It is also possible that the theories are rendered incomplete and less than optimally useful because they lack some essential ingredient, that ingredient being the open avowal and strategic incorporation of values.

**There Is Nothing So Practical as an Explicit Value**

Science is not value free. Scientists hold certain values about the nature of knowledge and about how knowledge ought to be constructed if it is to be considered scientific. Such values are known as epistemic values (Brown, 2001). Virtually all contemporary academic psychologists value objectivity. Throughout psychology, epistemic values (Brown, 2001; Crosby, Clayton, Downing, & Iyer, 2004) such as objectivity, empirical observation, careful control of variables, logical consistency with existing theories, communication in specialized language, and peer review are pervasive.

What about non-epistemic values, including values about the uses to which one puts one’s research or about what is worthwhile or how the world ought to be? Scientists are often aware of their epistemic values; but many scientists claim that science must be free of non-epistemic values.

In 2003, the *American Psychologist* published an article by Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, and Downing. The article argued that psychological research had shown why affirmative action is needed and also how to make it effective. The article also proposed that findings from numerous studies had shown that affirmative action operates in a way that is consistent with the American ideals of meritocracy and fairness.

Given the argument in the 2003 article, it was no surprise that some psychologists deemed the piece to be “political.” Both Howard Kendler (2004) and Gerald Zuriff (2004) criticized Crosby and colleagues for a failure to separate values from science. Wrote Kendler:

> Because the natural is cannot logically generate the moral ought, it becomes a non-sequitur to conclude that psychological facts can validate a moral principle or a public policy… Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, & Downing (2003) clearly rejected the principle of the fact/value dichotomy by concluding that affirmative action with preferential treatment is morally and politically correct. (p.122)

In their response, Crosby et al. (2004) replied:

> Kendler and Zuriff both chide us for interjecting values into the realm of science. Both Kendler and Zuriff seriously misread our argument imagining that we talk about “morality” which, of course, we do not. We hold the same value as Kendler and Zuriff about the dichotomy between data and values. It is certain that we cannot dictate values; it is equally certain that we can use data to show how social structures reinforce or undermine given values (Skinner, 1953). (p. 125)

Crosby and colleagues part company with Kendler in two ways. First, Kendler distorts the research of Crosby and colleagues when he imagines that their primary purpose has been to approve of affirmative action. Although Crosby et al. do
approve of affirmative action, they would—due to the value they place on objectivity—be happy to discover that affirmative action is not a meritocracy after all or that it fails in diminishing racism or sexism. If their research yielded such results, Crosby et al. would, contrary to what Kendler thinks, publish the results and move on to investigate other means by which to increase social equality. Perhaps because of prior opinions about affirmative action or what it represents, Kendler fails to understand the very purpose of the article written by Crosby and associates.

The second difference between psychologists like Kendler and Zuriff, on the one hand, and ourselves, on the other, is much more profound. Kendler and Zuriff implicitly equate objectivity and neutrality. We do not. Thus, while we strive for objectivity, we do not consider that we can be neutral about the place of our research in society or about the very shape of society itself. Kendler values the apparently disinterested motivation of those who dwell in the house of knowledge; but Crosby and associates think that only the privileged can afford to maintain the illusion of disinterest. Kendler devalues knowledge supplied by researchers who are motivated to create social change. Crosby and associates, in contrast, are suspicious of knowledge supplied by researchers who are motivated to resist social change. And Crosby et al. believe that all researchers, not just “radical” ones have a stake in society.

One way that non-epistemic values influence objective science is the choice of interesting research questions. Research is designed to answer questions. Once a question is formulated, researchers are expected to demonstrate rigor in the process of gathering data, testing hypotheses, and interpreting results. The same standard of rigor, however, does not apply to the initial formulation of research questions, nor should it. The invention of research questions is a highly creative process, as idiosyncratic as are researchers and research teams (Feyerabend, 1975). Social scientists bring their interests, past experiences, accumulated knowledge, and personal passions to their choice of what to research and to the framing of each new research question. Scientists who espoused eugenics and culturally biased intelligence testing thought they had achieved empirical adequacy as they amassed scientific evidence for racism (Gould, 1981; Myrdal, 1944; Richards, 1997). Bare empiricism did not protect against values (in these cases the values of White superiority and ethnocentrism) determining what was observed and what was not.

When scientists are blind to their own non-epistemic values, those values may influence the very observations that are made (Fortun & Bernstein, 1998). Crosby came across an example of unexamined values shaping research in the 1980s when she began her work on women playing multiple roles. Crosby began to work on the issue of multiple roles in part because of her wish to follow the intriguing lead of her student Lisa Silberstein and in part because she needed to understand an unexpected finding in one of her own data sets. In the late 1970s Crosby had conducted a survey of employed women, employed men, and housewives living in a suburb of Boston. Quite to her surprise, she had found that employed people
felt more satisfaction with their home lives than did housewives and that people who had spouses and children felt more satisfaction with their jobs than did single workers (Crosby, 1982).

Eager to understand why women and men with multiple roles would feel more satisfaction than women and men with fewer life roles, Crosby dove into the literature on multiple roles and the literature on dual job and dual career families. To her astonishment, she found that aside from a few brave souls like Walter Gove (1972) and Cynthia Epstein (1987), social scientists and public commentators wrote primarily about role strain and role stress (Crosby, 1987a). And to her dismay, Crosby also found that researchers and commentators paid scant attention to the “facts” of the situation. It was said, for example, that “jugglers” were particularly starved for disposable time; yet the research upon which such conclusions were based compared men and women, not juggling women with other women (Crosby, 1991). It was emphasized that jugglers were stressed; but the research did not show that women with many roles experienced more stress than women with few roles (Ayers, Cusack, & Crosby, 1993) and did show that jugglers were less depressed than other women (Repetti & Crosby, 1984).

The discrepancy between evidence and inference made Crosby suspicious that the unexamined values of researchers and other commentators were compromising their ability to think clearly about their research choices (Crosby, 1991). It was not just the participants in the studies who exhibited sexism; so did the researchers themselves. Without realizing it, researchers valued the experiences of men more than those of women, essentially saying, “We want to understand what these women’s experiences are like, so let’s compare them against men,” and so made men the standard of comparison for measuring women’s experiences. Only by suspending the assumption that males provide the baseline of human experience could researchers compare groups of women with one another. Either comparison provides empirical data, but values informed what was measured in the first place and the meaning derived from the measurements.

Of course, it is not just non-epistemic values that influence observations and sometimes corrupt them. The interplay between epistemic values and non-epistemic values influences the nature of the information we obtain. Take, for example, the often-unexamined value of convenience in designing studies and collecting data. In part because of the pressure to publish, researchers frequently make use of the most readily available population: undergraduates. As long as psychological research, research on prejudice and discrimination included, relies heavily on the psychology of college students, we will collect increasing volumes of empirical data about a population not representative of the wider society in terms of age, economic class, life experience, responsibilities, priorities, and relationship to authority (Sears, 1986; Sue, 1999). All this would remain true even if national ethnic demographics were accurately reproduced within universities. Much of the empirical research done with undergraduates as participants is structured by the value of convenience. Unfortunately, the empirical findings of
such research may not apply quite so conveniently to the wider population or to wider social issues.

Another epistemic value that can influence the course of research is the value placed on precision. Technologies that permit precision gain popularity, in social psychology as well as elsewhere. Sometimes the technologies themselves then influence the course of subsequent research.

An interesting example of the general case concerns the currently popular technology of assessing reaction times (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). The Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been taken by hundreds of thousands of individuals (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002) because of the precision of the measure and the ease of administration of the test. As a research technology, the IAT has generated hundreds of studies, which have increased its original value as a tool for “diagnosing a wide range of socially significant associative structures” (Greenwald et al., 1998; p. 1464).

Valuing diagnosis suggests valuing the possibility of cure, and a growing range of studies have addressed themselves to techniques for beating the IAT by inoculating test takers against the automatic associations which compose implicit prejudice (see Blair, 2002 for a review). Yet, among the hundreds of IAT studies over the last few years, only a small handful have examined the ability of the IAT to predict behavioral interactions between IAT takers and other people (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005).

Why has such a prolific and promising antiprejudice technology spawned so little research on actual interactions between real people? The question is essential because without it, while we are busy devoting our research to intraindividual phenomena, we do not know whether what we are studying will eventually impact the wide world of interactive discrimination. We need to know whether technologies for thwarting automatic associations actually improve people’s face-to-face behavior.

The answer has to do with individualism. Mahzarin Banaji’s “social unconscious” (Banaji, Lemm, & Carpenter, 2001), tapped by the IAT, is not a process that occurs in the unconscious of social groups, but within the minds of individuals. This may seem self-evident, but it seems that way only because individualism is such a deeply ingrained value in most social psychology (Ickes & Gonzalez, 1994; Pancer, 1997; Sampson, 1993; Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005; Solano, 1989). Individualism in psychology assumes that processes of psychological importance take place internal to individuals, in this case individuals who are considered to be containers for unconscious representations and implicit attitudes. Emphasis on the individual can be important, yet lack of attention to interpersonal processes may slow the journey to research-based interventions that decrease interactive discrimination.

In contrast to the intrapersonal approach is the work of Jack Dovidio and Sam Gaertner. They describe processes which occur in the unconscious of social
groups, as when objectively poorer performance of Blacks emerges from their multiple interactions with aversively racist Whites within organizations (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002). Valuing interactive social processes over social cognitions internal to individuals is likely to produce research that bears directly on interactions between people (Hebl & Dovidio, 2005). Learning about how to change interactions between people is likely to speed the journey toward social justice.

Parting Thoughts

In the earlier part of this essay, three theories were outlined which explain the discrepancy between the American value of equality and the non-correspondent American reality of discrimination: we may not value equality as much as we say we do, higher values than that of equality may override equality when we are forced to make choices, and, due to limitations on cognitive processing, we may not even notice discrimination when it is there. Similar statements can be made about any value that fails to guide behavior. For instance, as scientists, in as much as we value basic scientific values such as objectivity, or social values such as justice, it is worth exploring how our research findings become less than objective or fail to forward the cause of justice. We may not value objectivity or justice as much as we profess to, other values may outrank objectivity or justice when we must choose how to allocate our limited resources, and regardless of our valuing of objectivity and justice, we may not be capable of perceiving the influence of biases that preclude objectivity or align our research with injustice. In order to have any chance of evaluating how closely our research expresses our values as researchers (whether we value objectivity, social justice, or anything else), we must know what our values are and how they contribute, often without our awareness, to our research questions, methodologies, analyses, and conclusions.

Non-epistemic values have always been a part of social psychology. Social psychologists, along with other types of psychologists, have long considered aggression, hostility, and discrimination to be bad and cooperation, peace, and justice to be good. And social psychologists, along with most of the world, have embraced a number of different conceptualizations of what constitutes aggression, hostility, discrimination, cooperation, peace, and justice. Certainly, the authors of The American Soldier (Stouffer, Lumsdaine et al., 1949; Stouffer, Suchman, et al., 1949) and the authors of The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950) hesitated not one nanosecond in their evaluations of practices that they saw as constructive or destructive. Feminist psychologists did not invent the idea of embracing values in science. Where feminist psychologists have made a contribution is in reminding us to be explicit about the values that, all along, have been implicit in our discipline and many others.

Will the explicit embrace of values help to accelerate the effective application of our excellent theories? Will the infusion of honesty about our values contribute
to a quickened reduction of discrimination in the United States? We hope so; yet, only time will tell.

Our impatience with the rate of social change may sometimes be linked to our personal situations. When one has been working in the fields for 30 years, as Crosby has, time takes a certain cast. When one, like Bearman, is just beginning to receive opportunities to help integrate social policy and academic research, a different subjective time frame seems to operate. But in either position, we find both wisdom and solace in the often-quoted passage from T.S. Eliot (1942):

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

References


FAYE J. CROSBY is a social psychologist specializing in issues of social justice. She has written, co-written, edited, or co-edited 14 books and over 150 articles and chapters. Crosby is the recipient of numerous awards including the Carolyn Wood Sherif Award (bestowed by Division 35 of the APA), and has received an honorary doctoral from Ball State University. Crosby’s most recent book, published by Yale University Press, is Affirmative Action is Dead; Long Live Affirmative Action.

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