I. Introduction

In 1938, Bertrand Russell (1) asserted that "the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is a fundamental concept in physics."

The laws of social dynamics, he said, can only be understood in terms of power and it was the obligation of a relevant social science to seek to discover these laws. It was necessary, also, to classify the forms of power and to study the ways in which individuals and organizations acquire control over men's lives. He defined power "as the production of intended effects" and distinguished among three forms of power: influence, the use of incentives and deterrents, and coercion.

One might have expected that Russell's theory of this major problem in social science would have stimulated thought and research in social psychology in the three decades since its publication, for Bertrand Russell is one of the few extraordinary minds of this generation, indeed of Western Civilization. But few social psychologists seem to be influenced by the reflections of philosophers, and a cursory review of the recent literature of social psychology reveals that power has been dealt with minimally as a theoretical problem and virtually not at all as an empirical one.

There are a few exceptions. Herbert C. Kelman's (2) discussion of communication and opinion change suggests that "pressure," interpreted as a type of power, is a significant intervening variable affecting the impact of the ideas of one person upon another. John R. P. French's (3) theoretical approach to this problem equates power with force and influence: "The power of A over B is equal to maximum force which A can induce on B minus the maximum resisting force which B
can mobilize in the opposite direction." He develops theorems concerning the power of groups, and the nature of communication patterns, and the role of leadership, but the problems themselves do not seem to be clarified by this seemingly premature resort to mathematical models. Dorwin Cartwright (4) once stated that "the proposal that social technology may be employed to solve the problems of society suggests that social science may be applied in ways not different from those used in the physical sciences." But this speculation, which is consistent with Bertrand Russell's earlier statement, has not been followed by research into social power as energy or indeed by further reflection in depth.

Cartwright, in that same article, pays justifiable tribute to the leadership of Kurt Lewin in seeking to make social psychology relevant to the pressing problems of the contemporary world. Lewin was indeed convinced of society's urgent need for a scientific approach to the understanding and the democratic control of the dynamics of social interaction. Unfortunately it does not seem to this observer to be an overstatement to assert that the field of social psychology has not changed significantly since Lewin's death. His influence seems largely restricted to a small group directly associated with him and their own students in turn. Most social psychology is still primarily concerned with the investigation of isolated, trivial and convenient problems rather than with those problems directly related to urgent social realities. Attitude and opinion research, sometimes disguised as communication analysis, still dominates the literature of social psychology. But opinion research, while concerned with some of the ingredients of power, takes no stand upon them, nor does it concern itself with the consequences of opinion in action. It may ask how many persons are willing to live next door to a Negro and how many have no opinion. It does not usually investigate what such persons actually do in a given situation nor does it explore the means of social change that would alter or sustain the direction of their behavior. This research dabbles in reality, but avoids the real arena of action, and reflects, among other things, both a methodological sterility and a theoretical stagnation. Such preoccupation with methodological precision and measurement, reinforced by the inanimate energy of computers, appears to limit theoretical imagination and scientific creativity, and, therefore, social relevance.

It may be of some interest to speculate on why the bulk of social psychologists have so far avoided or seem to be reluctant to involve themselves either in a theoretical or empirical study of the problem of power. Indeed, such speculations might themselves provide some insights into the nature and the complexities of social power.

One factor may relate to the understandable human need for security, the dread of venturing out into the unknown where dangers
lurk, and the personal fear of entering into controversy and conflict. Another may relate to the need of a relatively new discipline for security. Just as one finds the retreat into jargon a characteristic of new disciplines like psychology and sociology which are struggling to achieve scientific status, particularly at a time when science is dominant as an instrument of power itself (in war, in peace, in government, in universities), so one finds a retreat into the preoccupation with language and with measurement in academic fields not sure of their place in the academic hierarchy. Psychology, sociology, political science—relatively new disciplines—are often afflicted with timidity and withdrawal symptoms, while even some of the oldest intellectual disciplines whose power has been slipping, e.g., philosophy, suffer similar anxiety patterns and adopt compensatory methods of handling the problem. Unfortunately, as insights from psychotherapy indicate, such solutions are no solutions at all, but simply reinforce the symptoms and further convince the real world of the unreality and irrelevance of those who seek to escape its demands.

There are other factors that doubtless interfere with a re-evaluation of the basis of social psychology. To accept power as an important concept for research—or even as the unifying concept—would force social psychologists to rethink the rationale behind much present research. Social scientists, any more than other members of society, are not more immune to social and intellectual inertia and resistance to change.

It may be argued also that since power is an abstract, diffuse and ambiguous phenomenon, it does not lend itself to objective empirical study nor even to precise definition. If one defines the relevance and significance of a scientific problem in terms of the manifest and concrete aspects of a phenomenon and the currently available methodology, such an argument does seem persuasive. Such an approach however would have made impossible the development of scientific precision in the understanding and use of atomic physics, for example. Certainly, the concept of the atom as first postulated by Democritus was not based upon directly observable and manifest and concrete aspects of matter. Such fundamental concepts of physics as energy, electricity and magnetism, such theories as relativity or the second law of thermodynamics, are primarily and essentially inferences. Even the reality itself, being nonempirical in its nature, must be judged often by consequences, not by the direct observation of a concrete substance. To demand that important aspects of reality meet the test of total concreteness—be directly perceivable and easily definable—is to exclude many if not the most important areas of reality from the province of scientific investigation.

Nor is it defensible to reject a scientific study of power because appropriate and precise methods of dealing with it do not now exist.
One of the functions of science is to develop methods which are appropriate to the study of phenomena that seem worthy of investigation. A goal must be set before the means to reach it can be tested; goals are not to be rejected because the means is elusive. To limit the scope of scientific inquiry to such methods as already exist leads only to scientific stagnation. Even if one grants the limitations and inadequacy of present methodology, however, this would not explain the dearth of theoretical concern with social power which now seems to characterize social psychology.

The problem of power is fundamental and pervasive in man's interaction with his material environment as well as with his social environment; within himself, in his interpersonal relations, in inter-group and international relations. Power permeates every aspect of human life and is therefore unavoidable. Perhaps its very pervasiveness leads to the attempt to avoid it—even to repress it psychologically—as a problem deserving serious and systematic theoretical analysis and empirical study. The psychologist may well feel threatened by a problem in which he participates as both subject and object. The student of social power must inevitably be a part of some power system himself; he cannot escape some degree of ego involvement. Problems of social power are necessarily related to problems of status, hierarchy and privilege and no human being can be outside of a status hierarchy or a differential privilege system. To pretend otherwise must be seen as an empty, pathetic, escapist and protective gesture.

A serious study of the problems of power might further require the social psychologist to become involved as an observer in social systems of which he himself is a part and of the status hierarchy within which he holds a status position, rather than merely to study some system "out there" or some primitive or exotic culture. But both anthropologists and psychologists usually believe that the acceptance of the value of detached objectivity requires that they explore only those systems with which they are not personally involved. How many American anthropologists are studying the ways of life in American rural areas or urban ghettos? Few other than Oscar Lewis or the specialists in the American Indian, and even in these cases the anthropologists are not directly involved with the group they themselves are studying. One could speculate whether the conclusion of moral relativity at which many cultural anthropologists arrive and which seems to influence other social scientists is not directly related to this lack of personal involvement. It would probably be quite difficult to maintain such a posture of cultural and moral relativity in dealing with the realities of a culture in which one has, oneself, been socialized and within and upon which one depends for his own personal security. This suggests a possible interpretation of the moral relativistic position as one not of objectivity but of indifference. Serious and relevant
research on the problems of race relations, segregation and desegregation, for example, would require social scientists to study not only racial attitudes and their determinants but also the more challenging and difficult problems of how a system of institutionalized prejudices is maintained and how it can be modified or destroyed. Indifference as to the result would be psychologically impossible.

The worship of a constricted concept of scientific objectivity; the need to protect oneself from the possibilities of status loss or the retaliatory use of power by those who are perceived as having, or presumed to have, greater power in our society; and the need to avoid involvement in power conflicts may all contribute significantly to the reluctance of social psychologists to tackle the problem of power as a legitimate area of scientific inquiry. One cannot study the problems of social power meaningfully with "total detachment." Conversely, if depersonalization and detachment are insisted upon as inviolable conditions for scientific objectivity and precision, then it is a fact that the problem of power cannot be studied scientifically.

The combination of these forces probably accounts for our failure to train graduate students in social psychology in ways of understanding and dealing with relevant and urgent social problems, such as poverty, desegregation, urban blight, political corruption, and international tensions. The attempt to disguise this desperate void in graduate training by making virtues of academic pedantry, qualified trivia and sterile objectivity and by insisting that these are the hallmarks of pure research is recognized as ludicrous by reasonable men who have not themselves been educated to share the delusion. This delusion perpetuates itself but is no less a delusion because we share it with or impose it upon our students.

II. Definition, Forms and Types of Social Power

One of the first steps in the development of a systematic and scientific understanding of an observed phenomenon is an attempt to define the phenomenon in terms both clarifying and testable. The challenge to do this in relation to power is both formidable and unavoidable given the facts that the phenomenon which the definition seeks to describe not only permeates all human action but is elusive and not easily understood. Definitions attempt to compensate for ignorance by making certain assumptions, delimitations and derivations, thereby expanding themselves by luring others to test them by more systematic observations, experiment and research. All first definitions, therefore, suffer necessarily from arbitrariness, tentativeness, and expendability. One can indeed interpret the task of empirical science as a continuous modification, that is, clarification or verification of theoretical definitions, and theoretical science as a continuous challenge to empirical research to prove it wrong.
There is no lack of attempts at a definition of social power, though those in the literature tend to come more often from sociologists, social philosophers and political scientists more than from social psychologists. The plethora and variety of definitions have themselves, however, contributed to the sense of the amorphousness or ambiguity of the concept. For example, Herbert Rosinski (5) defines power as "nothing less than an objective quality of all reality, a quality inherent in all that exists by virtue of the mere fact that it does exist. Power is an inescapable aspect of reality itself." Beyond the fact that such a definition could apply to many other phenomena, even in the language of some theologians to a definition of God himself, the definition is so comprehensive and inclusive as to make it valueless for systematic research.

Parsons tends to emphasize social contract and sanctions in his definition of power. He says a "power system is, analogously, a relational system within which certain categories of commitments and obligations ascriptive or voluntarily assumed—e.g., by contract—are treated as binding . . . Furthermore in case of actual or threatened resistance to 'compliance,' i.e., to fulfillment of such obligations when invoked, they will be 'enforced' by the threat or actual imposition of situational negative sanctions in the former case having the function of deterrence, in the latter of punishment. . . .

"Power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions—whatever the actual agency of that enforcement." (Italics added.) In other words, power is a form of contract between persons or groups, which if violated, may be punished.

Recently, a group of younger sociologists rejected the Parsonian emphasis on influence and sanctions and suggested instead the "decision making" component of power (6). Bierstedt defined power as latent force and force as manifest power. He attempted to distinguish power from prestige, influence, dominance, rights, force and authority. He sees power as essentially a sociological concept and dominance as a psychological concept. He defines authority as institutionalized power. Donald S. McIntosh (7) says that "power is the purposive control of events, or the ability to do so." There would seem to be a logical, if unacknowledged, continuum between Bierstedt's dominance by persons and the power of groups, institutionalized or not, and also between McIntosh's control of events and a presumably prior control by persons and groups of those events.

For C. Wright Mills (8), power is inherent in the ability to be "in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society," the ability "to make decisions which have major conse-
quences." Lasswell and Kaplan (9) also define power in terms of degree of participation in the making of decisions. The difference among Mills and Bierstedt and McIntosh, Lasswell and Kaplan, seems one of degree and not of kind.

Even a cursory view tends to the judgment that most definitions of power are either tautological or so inclusive or constrictive as to make difficult the development of subsidiary hypotheses as a basis for systematic research, though such limitations are undoubtedly a characteristic of all first attempts. Perhaps it would be foolhardy then to attempt still another definition of social power. Nonetheless, in the spirit which allegedly motivates mountain climbers to climb mountains, I hereby hazard such an attempt, offered in the hope that a theoretical approach might serve as a basis for systematic research and for its own modification and refinement, and lead, further, to the development of a relevant science of social psychology and an effective social technology.

It might be helpful, in establishing the role of social power, to consider the definition of power found in physics, at least as a point of departure (10). Power is defined in physics as any form of energy or force available for work or applied to produce motion or pressure. The concept of social power can be seen as having essentially the same meaning, namely the force or energy required to bring about, to sustain or to prevent social, political or economic change. Demonstration of the ability to achieve the desired change would be part of the definition of power. In its most fundamental sense, social power must be perceivable; it must be demonstrable. Pseudo-power, verbal power or substitute claims of power or denials of power would, therefore, be differentiated from power itself.

To the extent that this definition of social power leans heavily on the demand for demonstration of the power to regulate social change and maintain social control, it is close to Max Weber's concept of power as the ability to control the behavior of others and an approach strongly influenced by the pragmatic behavioristic traditions in American psychology. Its chief difference from the definitions summarized earlier is its emphasis not on the ability to decide or to be in a position of leadership—actually a potential source of power but not actual power—but its emphasis on the uses and consequences, on actual perceived social change.

A comprehensive theory of social power to be useful as a basis for social research must necessarily limit the practical area of concern—not because the theory is not large enough to encompass all uses of power, but because methods of research are more difficult to apply in some areas, as in war and revolution, which involve special forms of intensive, coercive exercise of power, which are impossible to study under systematic and controlled conditions. Psychiatrists are able to study with some effectiveness the trauma of battle, and psychologists
the results of military psychological tests, but social psychological research, if relevant, would be concerned with the power implications of war itself. Conceivably social psychologists could study alternative approaches to the resolution of power conflicts through military means. This would be analogous to William James' "moral equivalent to war" but could be stated as the "power equivalent" to war. Clearly the power structure in the process of waging a war cannot encourage research into such alternatives. At present, social psychologists are confined to the personal observations of psychologists who participate in the conflict itself or to the research following conflict in the use of authority by occupation forces. So, too, social research on the nature and behavior of revolutions is limited. Project Camelot, which proposed to study the causes of revolution or other social change, was frustrated as explosively controversial after American diplomats protested that such research appeared to other sensitive nations as a new form of intellectual imperialism and invasion. The direct research problems are somewhat similar for social psychologists who seek a systematic understanding of domestic riots and other uncontrolled social disturbances.

Another area which might on the surface seem to involve the nature of power, particularly as defined in terms of influence or change, but one that is not usefully studied as a problem in power is that typified by normative socialization, perhaps best understood not primarily as phenomena of power but as manifestations of the adaptive functions of life either within the individual or within society. For example, society does protect itself by institutionalization of criminals, the mentally deranged or those suffering from toxic and communicable disease. So, too, society controls its preservation of natural and human resources through water and forest conservation, and through education. These are all demonstrations of kinds of regulatory power, but because society generally faces fewer alternatives in regard to them and, since they are widely accepted as necessary, they do not ordinarily involve possibilities for conflict or controversy—or as wide a range of choices—in a stable and efficient society, and are a less fruitful area for research than those areas where choice and conflict do regularly exist.

Following from the above definition of social power as that energy necessary to create, to sustain or to prevent observable social change, some tentative premises and speculations can be derived. They are presented as exploratory attempts at the development of a social psychological theory of power.

1. Power is amoral; it can be used, as can physical energy, and nuclear power for good or bad ends but in itself it cannot determine value. It may be rational or irrational, constructive or destructive, in its consequences.

2. Power implies possibilities of choice in determining the priori-
ties to be assigned to various individuals and groups within a social system of differential status and hierarchy in the gratification of needs, particularly of the status needs—under conditions not characterized by deprivation or stark scarcity of the means of satisfying more primary needs. It implies also the ability to make and implement such decisions and successfully to control resistance or attempts to impose counter decisions.

3. Social power may manifest itself in varying degrees of intensity. Theoretically the continuum in the demonstration of power may start from (a) pseudo-power of mere verbalization or claims of a power which does not in fact prevail in the face of conflict and cannot effect change in the desired direction; through (b) latent power, which demonstrates itself only when challenged and to the minimal extent required to meet or contain the challenge; through (c) active power, which is usually overt, understood, sustained and institutionalized or generally mobilized in the face of continuing or anticipated challenges or conflicts; through (d) coercive power, which is the enforcement of the desires of the holders of power in the face of persistent and intense challenges on the part of others who desire to share or to seize the right to make the decisions and to control the direction and rate of social change. (Military power is a particularly intense and concentrated form of coercive power.)

4. Power can be seen as operating in terms of a "law" of the economy of power. One observes that the power holders—the decision makers who determine the priorities and the order and quality of need gratification in a given social system—do not expend any greater degree of power than that which is required to deal with the degree of challenge that confronts them. This hypothesis can be seen as an extension of the law of conservation of energy in physical systems and the principle of economy of effort in psychological and social systems. It would be violated only under the conditions of systemic personal instability as in the case of the neurotic, the psychotic or the brain-injured patient. Evidence of the violation of this principle in a social, or governmental, or international system would be found in any signs of the exercise of excessive power, that is, a power markedly disproportionate to the nature of the challenge or under conditions where there is no observable challenge or under conditions where the excessive exercise of power itself generates the opposition. By its very violation it betrays the inherent instability, the tenuous integration, or the incipient disintegration of the system. This could be an operational definition of authoritarianism or tyranny, and provide the basis for an observable and verifiable concept of social pathology.

5. The conditions of passive or active resistance determine the degree of power exerted in any given situation. Power can be expressed in relatively innocuous ways, such as persuasion, argumenta-
tion, negotiation, and bargaining—largely verbal communication—where such methods work. It can be expressed, in more direct ways in the actual control of the behavior of others, by institutional controls, restraints, sanctions or privileges—under conditions where verbal appeals and influence either do not work or cannot be risked. The confinement of powerless individuals to restrictive ghettos in the North can be seen as an example of this type of power by control. Coercive power, further along the continuum, tends to be exerted only under the conditions of overt resistance to the less intense forms of power where there is a significant and sustained challenge to the status allocations, priority positions, and to the implicit and explicit right of the power controllers to determine whether there will or will not be change. The law, the police, and other sanctioning institutions of the society operate with impunity in regulating the degree of dissent, challenge or demand for change that is tolerable to those who control the power. The tactics used in the South to preserve the system of oppressive segregation are an example of this type of power by coercion. The further step beyond such coercive power would be the use of sporadic or organized violence and beyond this or as a reaction to it military power or revolution.

6. The forms, the manifestation, and the intensity of the social power exerted would vary according to the nature of the threat or according to the stability, the security, the psychological health and strength of the holders of power. Here psychology provides an adequate and stable model for the social psychologist concerned with a more systematic study of this problem. The problem of human motivation seems to this observer inextricable if not identical with the problem of personal and social power. The psychodynamic theory of Alfred Adler is an attempt to explain motivation and social interaction in terms of the striving for power, rooted in basic feelings of inferiority emerging inevitably from childhood impotence and dependence upon adults. Indeed, Adler's insistence upon the universality of various forms of compensation and "styles of life" which dominate the struggle for a tolerable sense of worth and dignity may be seen as the intrapersonal and interpersonal level of social power. The implications of Adlerian theory for understanding personality development could provide the bridge for understanding and testing the relationship between a personal and familial level of power struggle on the one hand and the social and intergroup level of power conflict and accommodation on the other.

But such a leap poses a real risk of psychological oversimplification of complex social problems. It is all too easy to assume that one understands social conflict through understanding the child's struggles to achieve a sense of worth in his conflict with punitive or overindulgent parents who equally constrict his ability to develop. Adult com-
pensatory, self-protective, evasive and escapist behavior may be so explained. But despite the evidence from such studies as The Authoritarian Personality, and the immense amount of evidence and speculation from clinical experience, such explanations have not yet been verified. The promise of a unification of clinical and social psychology inherent in Adler's social dynamic theory and its influence on theorists and practitioners such as Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm, can be fulfilled only with further research. So, too, must future research make more precise the relationship between Adler's insight of the struggle for power and the organismic motivational theory of Kurt Goldstein, who succeeded in incorporating the concepts of a neurophysiological psychology into a psychodynamic theoretical system of striving for self-fulfillment.

But even if the source of the motivation for power were understood, with its implications for redirecting such motivation, this still would not satisfy the need of social psychology to study the consequences of the uses of power. To understand the source is not to deal adequately with the resultant phenomenon—the various forms of power.

7. "Non-functional" forms of power, anti-power, the deliberate non-use of power or nondecision, the hoarding of power, power waste and power atrophy, or power inertia, all may be effective techniques for determining or preventing change. Though it is difficult to determine the exact position on the continuum, some of such manifestations or non-manifestations of power may be seen as affirmative attempts to influence the power equation. The refusal by political or religious leaders to use their power in a moral conflict or controversy is an empirically verifiable exercise in power and its consequences can be studied. These types of default of power could be called "The Deputy" Phenomenon.

Power inertia, on the other hand, reflects the type of inhibition imposed upon the power controllers through the impingement of conflicting interests of equal intensity or appeals. This type of power blockage seems similar to the phenomenon of aboulia in abnormal psychology.

Still another form of nonfunctional power is the dissipation of power through waste and atrophy. For example, there have been both "strong" Presidents and "weak" Presidents in the American political system, yet the power inherent in the office has remained the same. One could postulate that a prolonged waste of power implicit in an office could result in the erosion or the atrophy of the power of that office. These conditions may reflect weakness, instability or decadence on the part of the sources and controllers of power.

8. Forms of pseudo-power appear to be effective uses of power but in reality are illusory. Verbal posturing, unaccompanied by the
ability to implement in action, the delusion of power, or the mistaken perception of power where it does not actually exist are examples of such pseudo-power. In quiescent situations, pseudo-power seems to be real, but in conflict or controversy pseudo-power, the conscious or unconscious pretension to power, it is seen to be ignored; it fails to prevail as a source of effective decision-making, the implementation of decisions, or social change. Pseudo-power ordinarily cannot sustain, or prevail, under conditions of prolonged protest or conflict. It is, in fact, the straw which may be given to and clutched by the powerless with impunity—and thereby tends to reduce to a minimum any realistic threat to the holders of actual power.

9. The voluntary transfer or sharing of power may also be illusory. This phenomenon poses many problems which relate to questions of motivation, the conditions under which voluntary sharing of power exists, and the most difficult question of the extent to which there is, in fact, any sharing or transfer which is not a reflection of an underlying power conflict and an attempt at resolution involving the "law" or principle of the economy of power. An example would be the withdrawal of colonial control over previously dependent states. It is generally accepted that European nations have voluntarily yielded political control to these "emerging nations," but they nonetheless often retain economic power there. When power is "shared" by the dominant, it may be that what is shared is the appearance rather than the substance of power. If the other side of the equation, the non-dominant, believes in the reality and seeks the substance of power, conflict tends to reappear or increase. The civil rights struggle in America may raise precisely this same dilemma for the present holders of power.

The Power Gestalt

In an integrated and efficient social system, significant clusters or reservoirs of power tend to operate as a dynamic Gestalt, each contributing to the unity and power of the whole social system despite the possibility and the actuality of conflicts among them. The interaction of differentiated and at times competing forces is directed toward the end of maintaining an integrated system. Serious internal or external threats almost invariably result in the mobilization of these various aspects of power to protect and preserve the system. From one perspective, this process would seem inimical to change—the maintenance of an essentially static state. This would be social stagnation. However, under certain, at present unclear, conditions, a given power source or a combination of power sources can exercise individual or combined power to bring about significant and desired changes in the total system, not only without any serious risk of disintegration but with an increase in the integrity and stability of the social system.
This would reflect a dynamic and constructive role of competing power clusters within the power Gestalt of the larger social system. This could be viewed as the basis of social viability and growth.

Among the significant clusters of power operative in American society are: 1. Governmental power. 2. Economic power. 3. Religious power. 4. Perceived cohesive power (ethnic, racial, religious, social class group identification) attempting to win for the ingroup members an adequate share of the status and other benefits available in the larger society (11). 5. Voluntary organizational power (professional, community, fraternal and other groups), sometimes cutting across ethnic lines to preserve and extend the special interests of a group, as the American Medical Association does. 6. Intellectual power which may manifest itself in terms of the prestige and influence of educational institutions and also in terms of the “expertise” of a growing group of technological scientists who are called upon by government and industry for consultation or “decision making” responsibility and, or respectability. Still another form of intellectual power is the power of the “critical,” “non-coopted” intellectual. His role is presently unclear—particularly as a form of power. That it is related in some way to power is suggested by the persistent anti-intellectualism of our society which is directed primarily at the “critical” rather than the coopted intellectual as the more likely object of attack and neutralization. 7. Propagandistic power or the power of communication of ideology, dependent upon the power of the press, the mass media and the function and power of educational institutions. Social psychologists have studied this type of power extensively, no doubt in part because the prevalence and manageability of the evidence (newspapers, books, television, opinion polls, etc.) make research neater and more easily encompassed. 8. Power of ideology—that power seemingly inherent in shared beliefs and values, particularly when they can be communicated emotionally and in terms of religion and, or patriotism. 9. Personality power, the power of leadership through prestige, authority, charisma.

III. The Need for a Unifying Theory of Power

A theory of power could serve not only as a unifying principle for social psychology but as a unifying principle for social science as a whole. There is an immediate and urgent need for the development of such a unifying theoretical approach if the field of social psychology itself is not to be relegated to an irrelevant, if not ludicrous level of ad hoc investigations of the type of trivial problems which lend themselves to the collection and tabulation of data obtained from the captive audience of undergraduate students. A unifying theory of power might
provide the basis for the theoretical and empirical integration of the fields of developmental, clinical and social psychology.

Although social psychologists in general have shrunk from considering the nature and consequences of social power, other social scientists have been less reticent. In sociology, studies of community leadership and power structure studies, analysis of the behavior of small groups, investigation of military leadership and the like have shown, in the work of the Lynds, Talcott Parsons (12, 13), Robert Merton (14, 15), C. Wright Mills (16), George Caspar Homans (17) and others, real concern for problems of social power. In political science the nature of leadership is under growing scrutiny, in theory and in empirical studies, as in the increasing interest in the nature of the Presidency. The works of Richard Neustadt (18), James MacGregor Burns (19), Louis Koenig (20), Clinton Rossiter (21), among others show a genuine fascination with the ways of power, and most such scholars have involved themselves in some way in the arena of power itself. In the field of economics, scholars like Peter Drucker (22), John K. Galbraith (23) and Adolf Berle (24) have reflected on power as a force in economic matters and in society as a whole; they, too, have tested their ideas in practical action. In the 1965 meetings of the American Political Science Association, out of 47 panels, more than one-fourth were directly concerned with leadership, social conflict, or social change. A further six of the panels were concerned with contributions from the other disciplines—economics, sociology, education, history and psychology.

The need is for greater unity of theory and research among the disciplines in the social sciences, but the social psychologists are not leading the way. Problems like those of power cannot be understood from only one perspective and only one set of facts—the skills and wisdom of all the disciplines must be joined if social science is to be effective itself in playing a relevant role of social power.

In a theory of power as a basis of social science research the distinction between pure and applied research with all of its status implications must disappear. Such a separation is not only artificial and meaningless but destructive. Not only must the disciplines themselves be unified in such a theory of power, but the fragmentation within research itself must also be dissolved.

The phenomenon of power can provide a basis for meaningful rather than pro forma interdisciplinary theoretical communication and research, obliterating those arbitrary lines of rigid differentiation among social scientists which are sustained by petty status distinctions, by trivial power concerns, and by sheer lack of imagination and the inability to grasp the coherence of ideas.

Yet there is danger. One political scientist preparing to write a
biography of Kennedy before his nomination and election was warned by some of his colleagues that it was impossible to write objectively about a subject with which one was subjectively involved; they argued even that such biographies should never be written about the living, that political science owed no such responsibility to the electorate. The controversy aroused by the publication of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s book "A Thousand Days," a detailed and intimate analysis of the decision making process during the Kennedy administration, reflects similar problems. Indeed, the risks are great. When one is involved and cares about the consequences, it is harder to be objective. All the more reason not to avoid the challenge.

There are many areas where social psychologists might direct their energies profitably toward a study of power: a study of power conflict and resistance, the nature of victory and defeat, of acquiescence and accommodation; institutionalization, and the regulation of conflict, intensification of conflicts; and the pseudo-resolution of conflicts through deflection; through escape valves and through regulated emotional catharsis. Social psychologists might ask even more fundamental questions such as "What do we mean by social change?" "What are stable criteria by which the idea of progress can be demonstrated as a fact in human social interaction?" "To what extent is perceived change or verbalization of change a reflection of the reality of change?" "Does significant social change occur under conditions without conflict?" "What are the fundamental value problems which underly these questions?"

Such questions are raised on the basis of the faith that a scientific understanding of the dynamics of society can lead toward a rational control of society consistent with democracy and with respect for the dignity and uniqueness of humanity. This faith, by no means yet verified, could be considered the encompassing personal and professional motivation of Kurt Lewin.

IV. A Philosophy of Social Change

The choice for society as a whole, as well as for social science is between capricious lawlessness, pre-scientific in its random patterns of change, and rational law, scientific in its plan for controlling the reality, rate and direction of change. Social science has a stake in such rational planning, for without research into the consequences of alternative actions and without imaginative theories derived from or stimulating such research, society cannot predict what its choices will achieve and cannot make reasonable decisions as to the best strategy for the fulfillment of human needs. Once social science and society as a whole has opted for rational planning—and resisted the anti-intellectualism of drift and impulse—they must decide between authoritarian plan-
ning, like the planning in Walden Two, in which the capacity for reason itself is denied to all but a few, and democratic planning in which men are not conditioned like rats to be happy according to master plan, but are encouraged to achieve the fullest measure of their own ability to think, to be troubled, to grow and to develop their capacity to respond with depth of feeling and understanding. But to meet the challenge of the constant danger of authoritarian control—even that which wears the cloak of benevolence—by regression to the earlier level of capricious irrationality is for social science to betray society and its own purposes out of lack of faith in human potential. Rational control is inevitable and the real test is which philosophy will guide its direction. At present, many of the most democratically minded social psychologists—as may be said to be true of political liberals—find conflict and controversy distasteful and rational control antithetical to their democratic faith. Because they do, they frequently leave the field to those less tender of mind, for whom Brave New Worlds and 1984 are interesting exercises in power, not to be condemned out-of-hand. They may leave the field of psychology to those who think man a creature of animal reflex, without mind or soul, to be manipulated for his own good through reward and punishment. Social psychologists cannot leave such important decisions to those who see psychology only as a strategy for mechanistic control and mindless reinforcements.

Rational planning is not to be confused with mechanistic control of man and society. The use of the approach and methods of a truly relevant social science for the development of a democratic social technology can increase human effectiveness, and is probably essential to social survival; and it can be consistent with human dignity. Mechanistic manipulation of man, on the other hand, unquestionably dehumanizes.

The ultimate question, asked by Plato centuries ago, is, can the rational and intellectual powers of man provide the power to control the irrational primitive and destructive forces? Upon the answer to this question rests the destiny of human civilization.

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