

Kurt Lewin and Soviet Psychology

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The history of science shows that the presence of different schools of thought, sometimes corresponding and sometimes opposing one another, is often useful to the development of science in general. This has been particularly true for psychology. Among its many schools and approaches, one can select some which, regardless of their original methodological positions, helped in the promotion of aspects of great significance for the overall development of psychology in both its practical and theoretical aspects. The theories of Kurt Lewin and L. S. Vygotsky are specific examples.

Let us briefly consider the most important positions of Kurt Lewin, but first let us note that any scientific approach is realized through its methodology. This is striking in Lewin's theoretical approach which introduced novel ways of studying personality. Lewin did not limit himself to description or to observation, but he emphasized the need of using experimental means for studying the dynamic structure of personality. Soviet psychologists, as I will demonstrate, adopted his methods and varied them successfully.

Lewin initially began with a critique of association theory. His main conclusion was that associative ties do not themselves possess activating power and, therefore, cannot alone motivate human behavior. Lewin then took upon himself the task of developing a system of concepts that could explain a multitude of psychological occurrences without reducing them to isolated causes such as *association, instinct, or determining tendencies of goals*.

Editor's Note: For the translation of Bluma Zeigarnik's paper from Russian to English, we are indebted to four different individuals who each contributed significantly to the effort. First, Herbert L. Pick, Professor of Psychology at the University of Minnesota, translated the paper. His translation was modified somewhat by Professor Henry Tapp of the Department of Germanic and Slavic Languages at Kent State University. Important improvements were then made by Professor Tamara Dembo of Clark University, Zeigarnik's friend and fellow student of Kurt Lewin in Berlin during the mid-1920s. I also received valuable help from Elizabeth Adams of the University of Massachusetts.

Lewin believed that the study of psychology should not be limited to the gathering of empirical facts, or of simple descriptions of personality traits and their correlations, but should be based on the experimental investigation of psychological occurrences.

Further, according to Lewin, *theory* is what is decisive in science. But theory must be confirmed by experiment. This is the general way of gaining scientific knowledge. The goal of every science is to discover laws, and the same is true in psychology. In science, the route to knowledge is not from experiment to theory, but from theory to experiment. The criterion of scientific certainty is not the repeatability of a specific occurrence. On the contrary, the occurrence acquires scientific confirmation in the context of theory.

This approach is presented by Lewin in the paper where he compares Aristotelian and Galilean modes of thought. Contrary to the Aristotelian explanation of occurrences, which finds its causes in the properties of the occurrences themselves, the Galilean mode seeks causes in constellations outside the occurrence itself. Aristotelian conceptualization serves the purpose of classification and thus inevitably distances itself from the concrete case, whereas Galilean conceptualization emphasizes the conditions under which an occurrence takes place and in this way expresses the laws governing occurrences. The Galilean mode of thought makes possible the explanation of an individual case and overcomes the apparent contradictions between universal statements and single cases. As a result, the individual case no longer appears as an exception to a rule, but becomes the expression of the same rule under varying circumstances.

The Galilean approach implies a shift from the simple description of phenomena towards an analysis of their causation. In other words, knowledge of the laws governing a given type of phenomena permits the expectation that, in a given situation, a particular form of behavior will take place. According to Lewin, establishing the genotype of an occurrence implies that one is also able to explain why, in this particular situation, the particular form of behavior takes place. Establishing the genotype of an occurrence, according to Lewin, implies the necessity of determining the specific property of a situation, which requires something quite different from a simple description. To determine the character of the situation, we must represent it in causal-genotypic conceptualizations

To give this paper a reasonably timely date of publication, we did not return it to Professor Zeigarnik in Moscow. Nor did we ask her to add references. The references in the second part pertain almost exclusively to work published in the Soviet Union in the Russian language. The references in the first part, which refer to work done between 1925 and 1945, can be located in publications concerning Lewinian research. Especially relevant, though, is one reference central to the literature on level of aspiration: Lewin, K., Dembo, T., Festinger, L., & Sears, P. S. (1944). Level of aspiration. In J. McV. Hunt (Ed.), *Personality and the behavior disorders* (Vol. 1, pp. 269–305). New York: Ronald Press. G. L.

(i.e., those that represent the universal in their laws). According to Lewin, therefore, to explain psychological occurrences it is necessary to examine the problem of interrelations between the person and the environment. Lewin always emphasized that neither person nor environment alone determine behavior. Behavior is a function of person *and* environment: $B = f(P, E)$. Therefore, we must examine what he meant by person, *P*, and environment, *E*.

According to Lewin, the central link between a person and his or her behavior is *need*, a dynamic tension system that underlies activity. It arises in a person with the first recognition of an intention to satisfy it. Lewin called this tension system a *quasi-need*. He used this term to emphasize that a need arising in a particular situation is neither inherited nor biological; rather, it is generated by the subject's particular situation at a given moment and, consequently, it is social in origin. It must be emphasized immediately that for Lewin the term *social* does not refer to historical social origin, but to experience at the phenomenological level. (More about this later.) Lewin's emphasis on quasi-need also indicates his recognition of the state of tension as the underlying condition in the development of personality. In his lectures, Lewin continually emphasized this; therefore, he called his theory a "dynamic theory of personality." However, in order for a need to arise, it must "*meet*" with a *corresponding situation*, i.e., meet a corresponding "psychological field." The psychological field is that concrete situation, that environment, in which the subject finds him- or herself at a given moment, and which includes definite positive and negative valences for the subject.

This is Lewin's most important position, which requires detailed consideration. In this way, Lewin questioned theories based primarily on biological need (Freud's approach), voluntaristic theories that consider will as the basis of behavior, and theories that consider behavior as determined by the environment alone, unaffected by the presence of corresponding intrapersonal needs (e.g., Behaviorism). According to Lewin, neither the person nor the environment are independent variables. They influence one another, they require each other. Thus, it is necessary to examine them as commensurable concepts. Lewin solved this problem by combining the person and the environment under a single concept, the *life space*. Structurally, the life space represents a system of regions more or less separate from each other. Boundaries between regions may be stable or flexible, depending on the properties of the specific situation and the person involved. The structural and dynamic properties of the life space are expressed by such concepts as interdependence, field of forces, equilibrium, and power field.

The life space has definable characteristics, such as *level of reality* and *time perspective*. Lewin emphasized that the concept of time perspective includes not only the present but also the past and future, modified by the properties of the *psychological field* in which the person is located. A person's experiences and

perceptions of the present situation are inevitably related to memories, expectations, wishes, and images about the future and the past.

In his paper at the Sixth International Congress in Chicago, Lewin emphasized that the "psychological past, present, and future" are all part of the psychological field of the present. In his lectures in psychology at the University of Berlin from 1925 to 1930, he stressed that the time perspective includes the future and the past of the person's real and ideal plans of life in the person's plan of activities. It is necessary to take into account the subjective character of present and future situations, and that expectations of the future have an effect on the person's present behavior.

Lewin further defined this issue. He said that while the basic principle of field theory is the dependence of behavior and other changes in the psychological field on its structure "at the given moment," this fact does not negate the influence of past experience, the historical conditionality. Lewin stressed that advocates of field theory actually do take into account past experience and future expectation, but only as they appear at the present moment. This position is reflected in his concept of *time perspective*. In other words, a person's present behavior and activity take into account a future "ideal" plan.

Lewin's theory makes a great contribution to the problem of goal formation. Whereas the majority of studies, beginning with Selz's classic investigations, posed the problem of goal-setting in the context of investigating thought processes, Lewin and his students related goal-setting to motivation and quasi-needs. A concrete example is the experimental work of Lewin's student, Ferdinand Hoppe, who contributed to the fund of psychological knowledge with his investigation of *level of aspiration*. It is necessary to state Hoppe's basic conclusions, which were the starting point for further research on goal formation and self-evaluation.

Hoppe emphasized that the choice of a given task, from a series of tasks varying in difficulty, depends upon the person's success or failure in performing the preceding tasks. However, the very experience of success or failure depends upon subjects' more general personal goals. Subjects always start a series with definite aspirations and expectations which change in the course of an experiment. Hoppe referred to each following choice as implying a particular level of aspiration. Every person has diverse goals: ideal personal goals and more immediate action goals. The following dynamic characteristics were definitely exhibited in his subjects' behavior:

1. The activity stops after success, if raising the level of aspiration reaches a limit, or if the structure of the task makes accomplishment of more difficult goals impossible.
2. The activity stops after a series of failures if all possibility of attaining success is lost.

In this way, every action gets its meaning only in light of a subject's aspirations to a higher goal. Hoppe explains this in terms of a subject's tendency to keep the level of "self" as high as possible.

Hoppe's investigations indicate that the formation of aspirations is a complex process. One's choice of a task, or, more exactly, one's choice of an immediate action goal, is dependent on one's more inclusive goals and viewpoints. In Hoppe's view, choosing a particular level of aspiration depends on one's ideal goals and one's self-concept. Hoppe's investigations lead to problems of self-consciousness and self-evaluation because they showed the following:

1. A performance is evaluated as a success or failure only if it is ascribed to one's own effort; there exists a definite relation between one's level of aspiration and level of self. Both the fear of failure and the tendency to reduce one's level of aspiration stem from the same source—a tendency to keep one's level of self as high as possible. This tendency results from the dynamic relation between self and environment, the presence of an inner personal goal that does not necessarily correspond to the objective achievement, as determined by the concrete assignment. Lewin stressed that it is the achievement of the *inner* goal, and not the achievement of the objective assignment, which releases the tension system of the quasi-need.
2. For each assignment there is a hierarchy of goals, determined by the relation between a subject's real and ideal goals.
3. Changes in the level of aspiration are related to the conflict between the tendency to approach the ideal goal and the fear of failure, rather than on a fixation on success or failure.

Furthermore, the conditions for forming a level of aspiration were also ascertained:

1. A level of aspiration is only formed within a definite zone of difficulty.
2. When tasks are too difficult or too easy, substitute goals take the place of the original goals.

The investigation of the organization of people's behavior, based on an analysis of the goals toward which they strive, was a most important concern of Lewin and his students. The ideal goal was examined in regard to its organizing function in human behavior. Hoppe showed that the all-embracing goal, which at a given moment is not immediately experienced but stands "behind" the goal and directs behavior, is what we call the ideal goal. Ideal goals are the person's all-inclusive goals, related to the person's self-awareness.

In this way it was shown that the situation of goal-setting is determined by noncorrespondence between the tendency to choose high goals and the desire to

avoid failure. In order to resolve this conflict, it was necessary to analyze the psychological situation of choice. The first attempt to study such a choice led to the *resulting theory of valences* advanced by Escalona in 1940, and further investigated by Festinger in 1942. Festinger showed that, with an increase in the level of difficulty, the valence of the goal changes: Achievement of a goal at a very low level provides hardly any feeling of success; that is, the valence of success at this low level is near zero. The valence of the goal remains equal to zero as long as the task remains "too easy." Festinger noticed that at levels of greater difficulty the subject begins to experience feelings of success; that is, the valences of success also increase. Finally, valences of success become maximal when tasks reach a level of difficulty too high to be mastered. Tasks experienced as "impossible" to master have no positive valence at all. Taking similar considerations of the dynamics of level of aspiration into account, Festinger concluded that in an experimental situation there is not only the expectation of success or failure, but also its prognosis.

Lewin and his students emphasized that, because each single action is related to the more general self-concept experiences of success or failure arise only within the subject's zone of *possible* success or failure; in other words, a single action belongs to a more general structure of personal concern. In order to better understand this structure, it is necessary to shift the lower structure to a higher level, which in turn is an element of the subject's all-inclusive totality (the affective-need sphere).

Thus the problem of goal formation, as seen by Lewin and his followers, was considered in relation to the structure of self-evaluation and level of aspiration, and required investigation into the dynamics of the level of aspiration. These dynamics were further investigated in regard to situational factors (success and failure) and individual differences—i.e., in dependency on the *level of the subject's potentials*. It was shown that goal formation involves a hierarchy of goals. Knowing how to distinguish between real and ideal goals is seen as the basis of a subject's adequate behavior in real-life situations.

We have emphasized Lewin's most important positions, developed during his Berlin period. Already in this period, one can trace those aspects of his theory that achieved special clarity during his later American period, namely, (a) a tendency to analyze personality characteristics formally, and (b) a shift to interpersonal relations as the source of human activity. Such concepts as life space, psychological field, valence, concepts of communication between tension systems, quasi-needs, and vectorial field, already implied formal topological concepts. At the same time, the concept of life space already indicated a systematic approach to the inclusion of interpersonal relations. The mere assertion that one's level of aspiration depends upon the experimenter's evaluation indicates the realization of the significance of the interpersonal relationship. Lewin emphasized that the relations between need and the psychological field are dynamic and

form a unified structure, i.e., the individual's life space, which can be represented in topological terms as one region included in another, i.e., person included in environment.

During his American period, Lewin progressively shifted from the study of *intrapersonal* problems toward that of *interpersonal* problems. He now began to use his dynamic theory of personality for studying problems of social psychology. He began to pay greater attention to questions of "group standard," to the problem of leadership, to its types (democratic, autocratic), and to problems of group atmosphere (Lewin, Lippitt, & White).

Lewin distinguished between internal group relations (e.g., sympathy, antipathy, protection, or submission) and those relations pertaining to the task activities of the total group. According to Lewin, informal relations are especially important in understanding groups. Relations that deal with concrete activities do not possess their own "fields," but are superimposed on informal relations without influencing the character of their fields. Lewin elaborated the concept of "group" in regard to both individual and social activity. The group appears as a concretization of the subject; at the same time, it is both a part and a tool of the life space.

After modifying it appropriately, Lewin used *field theory* to study problems of industrial practice; he concentrated on basic questions of labor productivity. One of his key concepts became *group decision*, which referred both to the group's members individually and to the group as a whole. Decision-making by an individual is characterized by an integration of a particular subject's motivation within the total range of his or her occupational activities as an act of volition. The function of group decision-making lies in the activation of the psychological field and the distribution of particular responsibilities among the members of the total group.

Later Lewin became head of the Research Center for Group Dynamics. Under his guidance, the Center investigated a wide range of problems: group productivity, communication and dissemination of influence, social perception, interrelations between groups, group membership and adaptation of individual members to groups, training of group leaders, and the improvement of group functioning.

In analyzing social problems, Lewin used topological concepts which he supplemented with hodological ones (concepts from the science of paths). He considered paths in their psychological rather than their physical meaning.

Lewin represented the person by a circle contained in an ellipse which represents the psychological environment. The circle representing the person can be subdivided into regions which stand for intrapersonal properties and processes. The person's psychological environment also has a differentiated structure. It can, like a person, be subdivided into regions that represent emotional and cognitive processes. It would be erroneous to suppose that these regions

represent physical objects or properties of the objective world. Rather, regions of the psychological environment represent a person's possible interactions with objects; only such interactions give objects their psychological character. During the American period, then, there is a sharpening of the dynamic character of Lewin's theory. This briefly describes some of Lewin's basic theoretical positions.

In Soviet psychology, Lewin's theoretical positions and methods of investigation have been intensively analyzed. The first who paid attention to Lewin's theory was L. S. Vygotsky. Vygotsky highly valued Lewin's contributions to psychology as a science and pointed to their fruitfulness. In his lectures, Vygotsky emphasized our indebtedness to Lewin for treating affect and intellect as a single system, as a basic unit. He also emphasized the heuristic character of Lewin's position and that emotional reactions cannot exist in isolation, as independent elements of psychological occurrences. Vygotsky further emphasized the significance of Lewin's ideas on mental retardation. He noted that Lewin's theory took the place of an "intellectualistic" theory of mental retardation, and that Lewin was the first to attempt to systematize a dynamic theory of mental retardation. Vygotsky wrote, "Recently a new theory has taken the place of the mentalistic treatment of mental retardation, one which finds its cornerstone of the disturbance in the affective life of the retarded children."¹

Lewin's ideas concerning the affective conditionality of human activity as well as about the communication between different quasi-needs also found its place in the work of the Soviet psychologist, L. I. Bozhovich, who pointed out that Lewin was able to show the dynamic relations between the person and the particular immediate situation. Bozhovich indicated that Lewin introduced new parameters in investigating the psychology of personality when making the needs and motivations of humans the object of investigation. S. L. Rubinshtein also noted the heuristic character of Lewin's position concerning the relations between need and goal.

At the same time, other Soviet psychologists also noted that Lewin's position, with its roots in the isomorphism of Gestalt psychology, suffers from using an ahistorical approach. In his work, "On the problem of mental retardation," Vygotsky showed that the idea of the unity of the intellect and affect is the cornerstone of any scientific psychology and is intrinsic to all Lewin's statements, being solved by him ahistorically.

Vygotsky justifiably noticed that Lewin treated intellectual activity abstractly. On the one hand, Lewin studied affective processes in a differentiated

¹L. S. Vygotsky. (1983). *Sobranije Ochinenii* (Vol. 5). Izdatelstvo Pedagogiki, Moskva, p. 232.

manner: He distinguished diverse properties inherent in the material of dynamic systems, he was concerned with the structure of these systems, and he separated distinctive features of affective processes into concrete and specific forms. On the other hand, Lewin treated the intellect as a single, uniform, homogeneous whole—as something pre-formed and not only incapable of change or development, but even lacking any complex internal structure needed for governing the functioning of intellectual activity.²

Vygotsky also believed Lewin's position vulnerable in that Lewin considered motivational-need processes as primary and failed to take into account the role of consciousness in behavior. Indicative is Lewin's article, "Reward and punishment," in which the behavior of the child is seen as dictated only by dynamic conditions (i.e., forces and their constellations). Another example is Lewin's explanation of why "substitute activities" do not occur in a mentally retarded child. He said that the tension systems of the mentally retarded are "inert," and that abnormal development depends on the tension dynamics.

Vygotsky noticed that Lewin must not have known an important dialectic position, namely, that in the course of development, causes and effects change their positions; higher psychological processes that evolve on the basis of lower, dynamic processes affect those very processes that brought them about. In the process of development, a higher form reconstructs the lower one. Vygotsky also stated that, for Lewin, intellectual activities were just a reflection of a person's affective life. Basically, Lewin assumed two different dynamics: a flexible one for affective processes, and a stable one for intellectual processes. In contrast, Vygotsky asserted that dynamic determination involved in action is also involved in thought. Just as our actions are all determined by our needs, so also are our thoughts motivated: unmotivated thought is just as impossible as uncaused action.

Tension systems, which correspond to quasi-needs, come about in confrontation with reality. The way in which a person experiences world and self determines the character of the quasi-need. Lewin identified this relation and made it the object of experimental investigation, but, in this unity, he gave preference to the affective processes. Meanwhile (and this is what Vygotsky pointed out), there is a continual movement of the dynamics of the actual situation into thought processes; conversely, there is a continual transformation of thought processes into the dynamics of real action. Without such movement, the conscious monitoring and regulation of reality behavior would be impossible.

Only the dialectic relation between thought and affect, between need and consciousness, assures the way that a human lives. When Lewin turned to social psychology, he interpreted social occurrences psychologically. He characterized

²Vygotsky, p. 243.

the "group" as a kind of dynamic whole, but did not take into account its broader social conditionality. A mixing of sociological and psychological categories took place. The reality interrelations between the person and the world were replaced by relations between person and phenomenological field. Rubinshtein also pointed out that, for Lewin, "the field of forces to which he reduced the environment of man represents only the projection of psychological needs and, on the whole, is only a psychological construction."³

In conclusion, it is desirable to discuss Lewin and his students' methodologies. It was mentioned earlier that any science is realized through its methodological procedures, and that this is especially apparent in Lewin's work. Many of his experimental procedures have been firmly incorporated into Soviet psychological research, in both their original and in modified forms. One can apply Rubinshtein's statement to these methods—namely, that when the results of analysis uncover some basic relations in a scientific area, these results become methods for further investigation. Many of Lewin's methods have proved especially fruitful for the investigation of personality changes in diverse forms of abnormality. A few examples are worth mentioning.

In investigations of self-evaluation, such as change in the hierarchy of motives, Hoppe's notion of "level of aspiration" has been widely used. One of the first psychologists to use his method was V. N. Miasichshev, who, with his collaborators R. I. Meerovich and K. M. Kondratskaja, as early as 1936, studied the level of aspiration in child hysterics both during free play and in experimental situations. Already in these studies, it became apparent that research on the level of aspiration must not be limited to the dynamic characteristics alone.

Hoppe's approach isolated subjects from their everyday relations with people and from the content of ongoing activity. Soviet investigators, in their studies, have attempted to show the dependence of level of aspiration on the content of one's activity (L. I. Bozhovich, E. A. Serebriakova). Using Hoppe's method as a base, Serebriakova established not only the role of the ongoing activity, but also that of evaluation in the formation of self-evaluation and self-confidence.

As a result of these investigations, several forms of self-evaluation were identified: (a) stable, adequate self-evaluation; (b) inadequate lowered self-evaluation; (c) inadequate overevaluation; and (d) unstable self-evaluation. In addition, different types of affective reactions to success and failure were established, and the relation between self-evaluation and level of aspiration was studied. It became clear that the level of aspiration expresses the need for a particular self-evaluation that satisfies a person.

The above implies the suitability of Hoppe's method for investigating how personality is formed in school children. The influence of age on the formation of

³S. L. Rubinshtein. (1940). *Osnovi obschchey psichologii*. Moskva, p. 429.

aspirations was also revealed. In young school children, fluctuating levels of aspiration depend primarily on evaluations by other people; in older school children, they depend more on self-evaluation (this research was done by E. I. Savonko).

In investigating the level of aspiration of mental patients, it was shown that its dynamics depend on many factors: the subject's self-evaluation, the subject's relation to the experimental situation, the subject's relation to the experimenter, etc. (Meerovich, Kondratskaja, Zeigarnik, Bazhanishvili, Kalita, and others). In these experiments, levels of aspiration were always compared with the character of a patient's activity, as determined through a variety of other methods. The content of the subject's activity was used for reaching conclusions about the subject's tactics of goal formation.

Investigations of level of aspiration showed how large a role is played by the content of the experimental task. In epileptics, the level of aspiration is clearly manifested when subjects are presented tasks that require motor manipulation. Level of aspiration cannot be successfully determined when such patients are presented tasks that strain the intellect (Zeigarnik, 1957). In another investigation, it was shown that level of aspiration does not manifest itself in somewhat retarded children when they are given arithmetic tasks they cannot solve. But the phenomenon is observable in these children if they are presented other experimental materials of less complexity, such as cutting out paper figures of varying difficulty (experiments of Vikulova and Sterkina).

Another useful method for investigating personality characteristics was used by Lewin's student Karsten, in 1927, in her study of *satiation*. While experiments on level of aspiration primarily investigated a directedness toward achieving or approaching a higher (ideal) goal, in Karsten's experiments goal directedness was more concrete. Her experiments dealt with maintaining and restoring the incentive for an activity.

The method of these satiation experiments proved useful for investigating patients' motivations. It was found that mentally retarded children show a "polarity" of behavior in the experiment. On one side, there appeared crude variations, long pauses, and temporary departures from the work altogether under protracted restraint and delay. On the other side, mentally retarded children quickly gave up boring activities, not introducing any variation or trying to change it in any way (Soloviev, Elipidinskii, 1935). These data suggest that some of the mentally retarded do not look for or cannot find supplementary motives for the continuation of activity.

We obtained interesting data from patients who have epilepsy. They not only maintain the performance of monotonous tasks for a long time, but they vary it very little. We had the opportunity to observe a patient who performed a monotonous task—drawing little lines—for a period of one hour and twenty minutes without showing even a tendency of varying it (Zeigarnik, 1965). If, for

normal subjects, a monotonous task presents no intrinsic interest—and if, for its continuation, some wider motive is necessary—for epileptic patients accurate and careful drawing seems by itself to provide sufficient motivation and made definite sense.

The experiments on satiation evoked a series of modifications. L. S. Slavina (1969) studied conditions under which a consciously established goal appears as a motive that overpowers the phenomena of satiation. It was shown that the presentation of a goal permits a child to continue working on a monotonous task, but only under one condition—the presentation of the goal must precede the actualization of a positive need.

Experimental data, especially on the level of aspiration, showed that through their own activity persons learn how to distinguish an ideal goal (i.e., one with a long-term perspective) from an actual goal. The ability to distinguish an ideal goal from an actual one provides a basis for the appropriate development of personality (B. S. Bratus).

At the present time, investigations are being continued on (a) determining the relations between self-evaluation (its changes) and level of aspiration, and (b) clarifying the conditions that facilitate or inhibit forming the level of aspiration. Other experimental methods of Lewin and his students have been employed by Soviet psychologists, including those on interrupted tasks, on substitution, and so forth.

At the present time, in many investigations, especially in the field of medical psychology, modifications of methods initiated in the classic works of Lewin and his followers are much used. A regular course of lectures on personality theories in diverse foreign countries, given in the Department of Psychology at Moscow State University, includes a section on “Lewin’s Theory of Personality.” In 1982, a monograph by Zeigarnik was published on *Lewin’s theory of personality*.

In concluding my report, I would like to return to the initial point of my presentation. Namely, despite differing methodological positions, Soviet psychologists benefit from the use of Lewin’s theoretical statements, as well as from his experimental methods, which have proved to be heuristic for the development of our science.