

## **Some Aspects of Social Process**

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Kurt Lewin, whom we commemorate today, remains a very real presence in the world of social science; and my colleagues and I are grateful for this opportunity to acknowledge the influence of his work and his ideas.

The field of study of the group which I represent has been that of social adaptation and social change; our practical effort that of securing opportunities to observe social process in real life situations. In this lecture, only an outline can be given of the situations and roles through which access was obtained for research purposes, and of the types of data and hypotheses which have emerged; but more detailed reports have just been published, or are in press. Although the examples to be given are military or industrial, scientific concern is with the dynamics of behaviour, and not with industry or armies. Experience of social process in these areas may, however, hope to contribute to the conceptual and methodological problems of work with many types of groups, even a group such as the family, whose central and guarded position in the life space of the individual gives it special relevance for any systematic approach to social dynamics.

The intention of this paper is to give some examples of mechanisms which operate at the level of both the individual and the group, but without recognition; and to illustrate how such mechanisms may affect the working and adaptation of groups in change situations. Five examples will be given; and in conclusion, a brief comment will be made on participation and authority, and on the reality and complexity of unrecognized mechanisms in group life.

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### Regimental Nomination

The first example is military. (10) In 1942, after severe losses and reverses, the expanding British Army faced a serious problem in finding enough officers. It was the responsibility of officers commanding units to discover and forward candidates for selection. But despite increasing pressure from higher authority, the supply of candidates remained less than one quarter of that required. At higher levels anxiety was voiced as to whether the Army could provide its own officers.

Records of a period of 15 weeks were analyzed, and produced the following figures: First, and most understandable, the nearer to a combat role a unit was (e.g. to departure overseas), the smaller the number of candidates it produced. Secondly, the larger the unit, the smaller the proportion of candidates. Thirdly, the more candidates a unit sent forward, the higher the proportion accepted. When the behaviour of 700 units was shown in graphic form (Figure 1), it was clear that the accepted, though tacit, convention was not to forward candidates.

After the reverses of 1940 and 1941, units had not yet had further combat experience. Commanding officers were uncertain of the military potential of their units. They feared casualties. They were suspicious of the unknown quality of reinforcements, and were led to inhibit what—in view of some later material to be given—we may describe as one component of the healthy labour turnover of a living social organism. Most commanding officers desired to maintain their units intact. Because of this, they were in conflict with the War Office, which needed candidates to pass into officer training. The War Office had attempted—and failed—to deal with the problem by increasing its demands on units, while unit commanders had abrogated their responsibility by an inhibitory use of power. The collusion of their unit groups in this situation was indicated by the fact that a commanding officer could usually say with accuracy that very few men put themselves forward for his consideration as potential officers.

It was observed that the units producing most officers had internal institutions to discover candidates. If similar internal institutions could be developed in other units, increased officer material might, it was thought, be obtained. Sanction was sought from the highest level, and thereafter from each level in the descending hierarchy, to invite four units to participate in an experimental scheme whereby the commanding officer would invite his unit, as a “regimental” whole, to share with him the responsibility for nominating candidates. The units were selected on the grounds of excellence in their own military roles, of nearness to drafting overseas, and of representative position regarding candidate supply.

The experiment was initiated through the usual executive channels, with the company of between 100 and 200 men as the nominating group.




Fig. 1. Negative conformance of unit commanders to the War Office requirement of nominating candidates for officer selection.

There were eleven such groups among the units selected. A company was paraded indoors, around tables, and grouped in platoons. In the presence of representatives of the higher field command and of the War Office selection organization, the commanding officer explained his difficulties and requested the assistance of the company in finding candidates for commissioned rank.

Each person was invited to write down under conditions of secrecy the names of any individuals, first, from his own platoon, and next, from the rest of the company, whom he regarded as potential officers. The nominations were sorted in terms of six criteria, each of which represented a sub-group in the structure of the company: first, own platoon; and second, rest of company (i.e. a man's in-group and out-group within his company, all ranks being taken together); third, private soldiers; fourth, junior N.C.O.'s; fifth, senior N.C.O.'s; and sixth, officers (i.e. criteria three to six are ranks taken separately over the company as a whole). Those nominated from three or more of these sources were discussed at a unit conference of officers, at which the commanding officer gave an officer-quality grading. The names, though not the grades, were published to the unit as a whole. All nominees were invited to go forward to selection boards.

The result (Table I) was an increase of 6,800 per cent in the supply of candidates from the four units. The pass rate was not significantly less than that generally prevailing at the time, while of those satisfying all six criteria it was higher.

More significant for present purposes was the effect on the commanding officers concerned. Previously, they had regarded the selection boards as a threat against which they must defend themselves. Experience of receiving the co-operation of their units enabled them to co-operate with the boards in tackling the problem of officer supply. Their comments indicated that anxiety over damage to the unit by loss of

**Table I.** Regimental Nomination of Candidates for Officer Selection

A. Nominative criteria and pass rates (114 candidates from 11 nominating groups)		
	Number of nominative criteria	Pass rate per cent
	6	77
	5	54
	4	35
	3	23
B. Supply rates and pass rates		
Nominating procedure	Candidates per cent of unit strength	Per cent of candidates passed
Usual channels	0.1	56.0*
Regimental nomination	6.8	54.0*

\*Difference not significant.


personnel was offset by the reassurance of finding an unsuspected amount of officer material, by an improvement in unit morale, and by an enhancement of their own prestige.

There was no selection of officers, only nomination of candidates; no abrogation of the rights of commanding officers, merely the opportunity, on an experimental basis, to deal with anxiety which had inhibited performance of one of their duties, with the collusive consent of those under their command. Through a complex situation which developed, this particular scheme was not continued; nevertheless, anxieties over the army officering itself were not subsequently voiced in the War Office, and practical methods of securing unit co-operation in forwarding candidates continued to be brought forward. Permissive and experimental sanction granted by higher military authority to an elite group of units, and the technical use of social psychological data and concepts, initiated a process which restored a co-operative relationship between higher and lower military formations to an extent that had seemed unlikely, so far as the supply of officer candidates was concerned. (8)

### **Two Contrasted Coal-Mining Systems**

In the underground situation of mining the physical locus of work is constantly on the move; there are unpredictable changes of conditions, with danger, darkness and difficulties of communication. Two systems of mining will be contrasted in respect of their social and psychological "goodness of fit" in this situation.

In the conventional system of British mining known as the "long-wall", coal is extracted on a mass production scale and the production process is broken down into elements of a rigid and repetitive character (Figure 2). In the 24-hour production cycle there are three separate shifts, who never meet, and have separate but interdependent duties; there are seven occupational roles, with varying status, carried by 85 men; four uneven types of working groups, and five different methods of piece-rate payment. The underground situation is treated as a factory, and the miner as a machine operation. In social structure, the system is incoherent while its technical rigidity makes it unable to use the initiative and flexibility traditional in the industry. Isolation exists at the coal-face, and community life is split by the shift time-tables, though the danger and stress of mining means that group security at work and at home is a paramount need. Supervision is remote and inspective, and a war with authority proceeds in a situation demanding executive leadership. The resulting stress is dealt with by various group defences into which we need not, at the moment, enter. (11)



QUALITATIVE	CHARACTERISTIC	LONGWALL	CONTINUOUS
	WORK ROLES	FIXED	INTERCHANGEABLE
	TASK ORDER	RIGID	FLEXIBLE
	INDIVIDUAL SKILLS	SPECIALISED	ALL-ROUND
	RESPONSIBILITIES	OWN TASK	GROUP TASK
	STATUS	DIFFERENCES	EQUAL
	PAYMENT	PIECE-RATES	FLAT-RATE
	TYPE OF SUPERVISION	EXTERNAL INSPECTION	INTERNAL LEADERSHIP
	INTRA-SHIFT STRUCTURE	SEGMENTED	INTEGRATED
	INTER-SHIFT RELATIONS	DEPENDENT	INDEPENDENT
COMMUNITY EFFORT	SPLITTING	COHESIVE	

QUANTITATIVE	CHARACTERISTIC	LONGWALL	CONTINUOUS
	FACE LENGTH	300 YDS	100 YDS.
	CYCLE - TIME	24 HOURS	7½ HOURS
	SHIFTS PER CYCLE	3.	1.
	ADVANCE PER 24 HOURS	5 FT.	15 FT.
	PRODUCTION UNITS	1.	3.
	MEN PER UNIT	85.	25
OUTPUT PER MAN PER SHIFT	4.4 TONS	6.0 TONS	

Fig. 2. Equivalent areas of coal extracted in same time at same level of mechanization (Seam height—3 ft. 6 in. Depth below surface—1869 ft.).

The longwall system came into being through the failure of the traditional hand-got methods of coal-mining in a changing economic situation. The system has persisted in part as the result of an inductive effect from other industries. Its impending bankruptcy under full employment is indicated by a trio of linked difficulties—low productivity, high costs and shrinking man-power. In this situation, one divisional executive of the National Coal Board threw to his immediate subordinates the problem of a complete reconsideration of mining methods; and, as one result, a new and widely applicable system of continuous mining is being developed on an

experimental basis. It has involved redeployment and a day-wage—both controversial matters—but sanction for the experiment was obtained by the divisional executive from a pit-head meeting of the 1,500 miners concerned. (9)

In this new system (6, 7) a coal-face one third as long is advanced three times as far in the twenty-four hours. The total task of coal-getting is completed in a one shift cycle, so that each shift group is an autonomous unit of 25 men. (Fig. 2). This has eliminated trouble between shifts; while within shift groups the changing requirements of the production task are being flexibly shared. One effect of their own increased sense of group cohesion and responsibility is that the men have begun to demand a higher level of executive leadership; technical advice on the job is being sought, and criticism is more willingly accepted. There is a single category of multi-skilled workman and a single method of payment by day-wage, which have eliminated status differences. Freed from the need to deal with minor pay-packet troubles, the men's union representatives have been participating constructively in the development of the scheme. Group security at the coal-face has diminished stress, and miners who could no longer operate the old system are back at work at the age of 55. Men share the shifts, and there are signs of a better atmosphere in family and community life. Production so far is up 30 per cent with man-power saved and costs cut. The target is to reduce the selling price of coal by 20 per cent.

The facts outlined are consistent with the view that a technological work system, such as the longwall method of mining, may possess an unrecognized function: that of permitting the carrying out of a production task in a way which also provides for the absorption of reciprocal hostility between management and workers, traditionally acute in the British mining industry. At the same time, however, this hostility is fed and maintained through the frustrations generated by the system. The common control by this work system, which forced isolation on the job, permitted common allegiance to the management-worker split, and common acceptance of the existence at the coal-face of a leaderless work group with groupless leaders. Acceptance of executive responsibility for the human as well as the technological aspects of the work situation, and the undoing of the split between these, has broken the vicious circle of hostility and frustration and contributed, at least on a local basis, to undoing the split between workers and management.

### **The Glacier Project**

The project from which the material of the third example is drawn (2) may be described as a technical collaboration between an Institute research

team and a light engineering factory of some fifteen hundred employees. The factory forms part of the Glacier Metal Company, and we have come to describe the relationship as the Glacier Project. The purpose of the project – as agreed some three years ago – was to investigate the gap which existed between the firm's declared aims and its actual achievement in relation to such participant practices as joint consultation. A study of the forces and mechanisms maintaining this gap, and of the efforts of the firm to close it, have formed the task. After initial agreement between management and the research team regarding aims and methods of work, over three months was spent in obtaining the agreement of the Works Council, the Supervisors Group and the Works Committee. This last was a workers' group linked to a number of local trade union organizations; and agreement on the project required reference upwards to the highest trade union levels.

The research policy suggested – and ultimately accepted by all groups – was that of making the team's collaboration available to any group or individual who requested it. The team undertook to initiate no other investigation within the firm, and to maintain strict professional confidence with respect to its relationships and discussions. Only problems directly concerning a particular group would be considered, and only agreed communication would be made of anything which emerged. Such a policy involved agreement to publish, for example, only material which had been so worked-through with those concerned that it had become past history, and so could be made public without embarrassment.

Requests for assistance were received from a variety of groups within the factory. As Figure 3 will show, the periods of time spent in working with these groups were very considerable, and must be related to the effort required to recognize, and to deal with, latent factors in group behaviour.

In working with a group – say, at its regular weekly meetings – a member of the research team would endeavour to help the group to recognize previously unrecognized factors in its behaviour with respect to the problem under discussion. He would offer for consideration interpretive hypotheses whose effect might be to permit a restructuring of the group's perception of its situation and hence a move towards more appropriate action.

The main result, over two and a half years, has been to facilitate the formulation and assimilation of a new company policy governing executive and consultative functions. In relation to this new policy, and in terms of gross changes in social structure, the stages of work at which such changes occurred are indicated in Figure 3. The changes were:

- (a) The Works Council was re-structured from a two-sided worker-management council to a multi-group institution including representatives of workers and of all grades of staff;






Fig. 3. Course of glacier project (April 1948-December 1950).

- (b) These changes in the Works Council were dependent on changes in the trade union sector of the factory. The workers' representative body (the Works Committee) had been composed of trade unionists who were not necessarily shop-stewards; in the new situation the Works Committee has been replaced by a Shop-Stewards Committee, based on an increased union membership, sanctioned by the local union officials and fully linked to their organization.
- (c) The executive system of the factory was re-structured from a loose network of heterogeneous groups into a hierarchy of chains made up of two-level nuclear commands. (A nuclear command is an executive with his immediate subordinates).
- (d) Changeover from piece-rate to flat-rate methods of payment was carried out in two main departments.

These changes were not imposed by management; and, as previous experience had shown, could not with success have been so imposed; nor were they suggested by the research team. They emerged in large part from the slow and painful acquisition by groups and individuals of new perceptions of the significance of their behavior, and may be summarized as results of a change in the customary way of tackling problems; that is, as a change in the culture of the factory.

This is perhaps most clearly seen in the abandoning of the original view that giving orders was authoritarian and therefore invariably to be rejected, and conversely, that participation in the form of joint consultation and group decision was, invariably, democratic. The view ultimately taken was within a different frame of reference—that of the participant *sanctioning* of authority and the responsible *carrying out* of executive roles. In work towards this change there were disclosed the existence and importance of serious anxiety among workers over effective participation in sanctioning authority; and, among executives, over the personal and internal sanctioning required in themselves for the discharge of the authority invested in them. For example, the Works Committee, in private session, all but rejected the opportunity of effective participation offered to them, on the grounds that they would be taking on more than they could cope with; the expressed fear was that they would not be able to call forth the necessary skill and constructiveness to deal with the new responsibilities. Many managers, on the other hand, after achieving full authority over their own commands, were some time before they began to give up tendencies to return to the previous situation (about which they had complained so much) by getting rid of parts of this authority to specialists and to the consultative system. It also became obvious and accepted that the firm's early attempts at joint consultation had two different aspects: first, a constructive attempt to achieve a democratic culture and structure in the factory, and secondly, a collusive attempt to evade the anxieties mentioned a moment ago. The achievement of the new policy required the acceptable demonstration of the ineffective and anxiety-evading nature of many components in group behaviour, by the examination of such behaviour in face-to-face situations.

It may be worth noting that these far-reaching changes, and the time, effort and disturbances connected with them, have in no way prevented the firm from making a considerable expansion. They have been accepted as a contribution to effective growth and adaptation.

### **An Unrecognized Mechanism in an Expanding Machine Shop**

The fourth example (4) is concerned with an acute form of a problem which is common in rapidly expanding industrial concerns. After a period

of lay-off, a machine shop of the Glacier Metal Company was faced with an urgent need to expand. This aroused anxiety in the workers and faced them with a dilemma: severe competition in the market for their product demanded faster production methods, but this meant a reduction in the number of workers on particular jobs and consequent disruption of working relationships; further, to resist such reorganization would aggravate fears of future lay-off, but to accept reorganization would earn them the reputation of accepting a “sweat shop” situation, and incur hostility from workers in other departments.

After two rather confused and troubled periods—in which the whole shop, both management and workers, was involved in a round of meetings, elections, resignations and re-instatements—a third phase of wage negotiation was opened. The worker’s demand was for a change from piece-rates to a flat-rate, with “merit” money for the more skilled. The important points are:

- (a) that the conduct of negotiations was confined to a *small group* comprising three leading members of the Workers’ Committee and a similar small number on the management side.
- (b) that negotiations were continued for a period of very unusual length—over a year.
- (c) that the group life of the shop stabilized round the fact of keeping the negotiations in existence.
- (d) that within this situation the shop completed its expansion and met its production targets.

Through the existence of a collaborative and interpretative role taken by an Institute staff member—a role of the type described earlier in relation to the total project—it became clear that the sequence of events had been this: experience of the troubled earlier period had reassured leading members of the Workers’ Committee, first, about the predominance of productive rather than rate-cutting intentions in management; and secondly, about their own capacity to lead without reference back to their constituents. They became able to carry within themselves the conflict resulting from the workers’ attempt to adapt to expansion. The fight *against management* on behalf of individual needs regarding payment was encapsulated within the small negotiating group. By this mechanism the rest of the department was freed to struggle *against competing firms*, under the leadership of management. The negotiating group, by encapsulating the worker-management tension within itself, contributed to the completion of the production task by making it possible for management leadership to be exercised over the mutually agreed and acceptable factory objective. But the negotiating group could so contribute to the completion of the production task only by keeping its own consultative task uncompleted. Of the fact that

it might be performing such a latent function, in contradistinction to its manifest function of reaching a settlement, the negotiating group remained unaware. But this interpretation, when made, was accepted by all concerned. This encapsulation of the negotiating group can be seen as an example of what may be called adaptive segregation, just as the splitting and schisms in the longwall coal-mining situation may be regarded as an example of what may be called mal-adaptive segmentation.

Superficially, in following management in the production task the workers seemed to have abandoned their own leaders in the consultative task. Actually, the level at which their committee was exercising leadership had changed from manifest to latent. At manifest level leadership requires followership in the direction taken by the leader, but at latent level, leaders may fill the role required of them, yet move in a direction which appears to differ from that taken by their followers.


In field theory terms, as shown in Figure 4, a locomotion induced by a leader at reality-level may occasion not only a restructuring of the group field at this level, but also at irrealty-level, where leadership and locomotion are required in a different direction. Restructuring at reality-level may indeed only be possible if re-structuring at irrealty-level is in a different direction and has different leaders. In a situation such as that described, two kinds of leadership—management and representative—were provided by the social structure, and were used by the group at different levels simultaneously.

### **Group Stability and Labour Turnover**

Any human institution is composed of the people who enter it, stay for a period and eventually leave. To persist, the institution must replace those who leave. To retain any unique institutionalized characteristics, it may be assumed to possess some kind of self-regulating mechanism. This would constitute a special case of the Lewinian notion of quasi-stationary process.

(3)

Entering and leaving is the labour turnover of industrial institutions. Current approaches to labour turnover have, however, focussed attention on rates of leaving and reasons for leaving; entering has received less attention. The findings to be outlined (5) were obtained by examining the total process by which two contrasting firms both replaced their leavers and accommodated themselves to the consequent changes in the composition of their labour force. In the period under review both underwent expansion and contraction and experienced the change from war to peace under London conditions. Attention was directed to the relationship between engagements and terminations, rather than to that between terminations



**Fig. 4.** Leadership in reality-irreality dimension. This diagram represents in simplified form the group structure of the Line Shop during the third phase, at a time when the negotiating group was in session. Key: Reality level: A—region of negotiating group ( $A_1$ : management,  $A_2$ : leading members of Shop Committee). B—region of the Line Shop ( $B_1$ : Shop Management,  $B_2$ : Shop Committee,  $B_3$ : Workers). C—region of competitors. Irreality level:  $\beta$ —region of the Line Shop ( $\beta_1$ : Shop management,  $\beta_2$ : Shop Committee,  $\beta_3$ : Workers).

and numbers employed. The method of study was to follow-up entrants rather than investigate leavers.

When the numbers who left in successive periods were calculated as percentages of their entrant groups, it was found that the resulting curves—they could be called survival curves—conformed more and more closely to a regular pattern the larger the entrant group became. (Figure 5) The curves shown do not begin until the end of the first three-month period. The consideration that engagement and termination could happen simultaneously only in rare cases suggested a concealed mode in the first




Fig. 5. Survival distribution of leavers as a percentage of total entrants.

three-month period. It was found that if a sufficiently large group of entrants could be examined, so that the survival periods could be made as short as one week for the Glacier factory and as short as one day for the X factory, as the second was called, this mode could be demonstrated in the third week for Glacier and the first week for X. The shape of the distributions suggested that the course of the labour turnover process had three phases:

- (a) *a period of induction crisis*, during which a number of casualties results from the first interaction between the engaging company and the aggregate of entrants.
- (b) *a period of differential transit*, during which survivors learn the ways of life of the firm and how far they have any place in it.
- (c) *a period of settled connection*, when those who still survive take on the character of quasi-permanent employees.

By assuming that those who entered in any one month “began to leave” in the following month, the number of expected leavers in any one month can be calculated entirely from data about previous entrants. In the example to be given (1) the data went back to 1942 and permitted calculation of expected leavers from the Glacier factory for the years 1948, 1949 and 1950. This forms the basis of Figure 6.<sup>1</sup> A lay-off period in early 1949 was preceded by six months in which expected values of the number of leavers had all been above actual values. Yet at the end of three years the total number of actual leavers was only one less than the total of expected leavers, calculated by the method described.

These results are reconcilable with the theory that labour turnover is the resultant of a quasi-stationary process which acts as a self-regulating mechanism; and that both the lay-off and preceding “stocking up” were fluctuations about a level of equilibrium. There was, however, insufficient evidence to show whether or not the level of the process in this case was itself a part of a larger and more complex fluctuation.

### Concluding Comments

From experiences of the kinds described I should like, in conclusion, to select two points of current interest for brief comment.

The first is the reciprocal relationship of participation and authority. In the studies reported, a differentiation is made between sanctioned authority and unsanctioned autocracy. Sanctioning is a cultural process by

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<sup>1</sup>Editor's note: Figure 6 could not be reproduced here for technical reasons. It appears in the original *JSI* Supplement 5, 1951, p. 20.

which power is linked to authority. Power is an attribute of an individual or group—the strength of influence he or it is capable of exerting through skill, knowledge, group cohesion and other factors. Authority is an attribute of a role and is defineable as what may be done in a role.

In terms of such definitions, the following formulation of the concept of participation is possible. The act of participation may be regarded as taking a role in a social system. As to the conditions affecting full participation, first, there must be the offer of a role, and freedom to choose a role which is acceptable. The role itself then requires sanction from *above*, from *below*, and from *within* the individual or group. Finally (and this is the more limited sense in which the term participation is usually employed) there needs to be an opportunity to take part in prescribing the authority, position and other attributes of the role taken, and in deciding the policies governing the day-to-day operation of the role. One corollary of such a formulation is the likelihood that institutions with a hierarchic structure will require both executive systems for the exercise of sanctioned authority in defined roles, and mechanisms through which full and appropriate sanctioning for this authority may be obtained.

The final point to be made may be introduced by saying that it is through experiences of the type outlined that my colleagues and I are gaining a fuller appreciation of the usefulness and fertility of Lewin's work—for example, of his idea of "unfreezing" situations as points of entry for the study of social processes, and of his concept of quasi-stationary equilibrium as pointing to a basic property of group life. In the maintenance of such equilibria, the forces concerned may be both manifest and latent; the same may be true of the mechanisms used. The operation of latent mechanisms may be seen in the individual, as he seeks consciously and unconsciously to maintain adaptation or diminish anxiety; or, in groups, where they are employed as a means towards recognized or unrecognized goals, or as a defence against group stress.

Ideas of this kind are perhaps most familiar in psychoanalytic theory, but they raise questions which are touched on in Lewin's writing under the heading, for example, of "concept, method and reality in social science". One approach to such questions may be summarized in this way: first, the individual, in the course of his development, has painfully worked out a set of deeply-rooted assumptions as to what is real and what is important in determining behaviour; secondly, these assumptions, even although they may have become unrecognized, give meaning to his life, and offer some protection from fear and uncertainty; and, thirdly, even personal attempts to recognize and reconsider such deeply-rooted assumptions arouse anxiety and resistance which can only be overcome by serious psychological effort. Under certain definable conditions, however,—particularly those of



professional work dealing with practical human and social problems—the need to overcome a difficulty, that is, the need for change, may offset such anxiety and resistance, permit first-hand observation of relevant areas of behaviour, and provide at least the opportunity for reconsideration of what is acceptable as real.

In some of the studies reported, relationships and work of this kind have been sustained over a period of years. Such experience has brought us face to face with the prevalence and complexity of unrecognized mechanisms in group life, and with their importance in maintaining quasi-stationary equilibria which resist change. Such resistance may be strong, persistent, and completely inconsistent with the manifest goals and striving of groups. For example, an unrecognized collusion between the groups concerned—and in relation to latent goals—was an outstanding feature of the first four studies described in this paper. To consider the reality of such phenomena and such situations, to develop methods of gaining access to them, and to formulate concepts for understanding them, are major challenges to social science at the present time.

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